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SUPRE~!E

COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

I

J. T. CHAl\1BERS,
,
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vs.

Case No.
9554

R. W. SIMS,
,
>
Defendant and Appellant,
Case No.

vs.
lVIARGARET S. CHAMBERS,
Cross-Defendant N Respondent.

9556

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND CROSS APPELLANT IN 9554,
WHO IS APPELLANT IN 9556

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Third District Court
of Salt Lake County, Honorable Merrill C. Faux presiding, wherein the Court entered judgment for the
plaintiff and against the defendant and in favor of the
cross defendant in an action for partnership accounting.
Plaintiff and defendant were general partners in
the South East Ready Mixed Concret Company for
1
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some 12 years. Cross-Defendant is the wife of the
plaintiff and sister of defendant and was active in the
business during the entire time. Her duties were multifarious and included handling orders, supervising records, collecting accounts, and running the office generally. Much of the trial was devoted to consideration
of the duties, authority and functioning of Mrs. Chambers.
The partnership was formed May 8, 1948, as a
limited partnership (Exhibit 11-D) and terminated
when an Agreement of Dissolution was entered into
(Exhibit 10-D) . This action was instituted to recover
from defendant the sum of money indicated on the
capital accounts of the partners' records before division
of net profits. Defendant filed a counterclaim and interpleaded Mrs. Chambers, alleging a different theory of
compensation of partners and charging cross-defendant
with faulty. record keeping.
More specifically, the complaint alleged that the
practice of the partners had been to recognize claims
for salaries of the plaintiff and cross-defendant before
division of the net profits equally between the plaintiff
and defendant; that annual information tax returns
have been filed on that basis; that the final balance sheet
had been made up to the time of the dissolution and
requesting determination of the partnership agreement;
that the books and records are binding upon the partners
and that they are bound by the annual statement of
profits and division thereof and that in the dissolution,
2
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capital accounts be paid off according to their balances
as shown in the records and for a final accounting between the partners ( R. 1 to 9) .
The lengthy answer, counterclaim and cross-claim
challenged the sufficiency of the books and records, set
up a different theory of the agreement between the
partners for compensation, charged the cross-defendant
with improper record keeping and sought corrections
in the books and records, payment of salaries to the
defendant, reduction of salaries to the plaintiff and crossdefendant and for settlement of the accounting in accordance with the claims of defendant. (R. 19 to 30).
Interrogatories were submitted and answered after
appeal to the Court for assistance, and depositions were
taken and concluded in the same manner, all engendering bad feelings and mistrust.
The accountants of the parties worked together
and reconciled all accounting differences except the
issue of salaries. The pre-trial order noted the success
of the accountants in reducing the issues, noted the
claim of defendant for $48,900.00 additional salaries
and that there would be a contest on every salary and
every partnership distribution entry in the books and
as to entries which should have been made and were
not made. Defense of the Statute of Limitations as to
the claims of defendant was noted, and the Court gave
a starting place for the settlement of accounts between
the parties by giving balance sheet figures as agreed by
the accountants and leaving the issue of salaries to be
3
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determined. The pre-trial order also required the furnishing of certain information by each party to 'the
others and denied the motion of cross-defendant for
dismissal as to her ( R. 86 to 88) .
When the case came on for trial, extensive opening
statements were made by both sides (R. 255 to 292).
During the course of the opening statements, defendant
suggested that reasonableness of salaries could be eliminated as an issue (R. 265, 283, 287, 288). Plaintiff
suggested that reasonableness was an issue but thought
it could be elilninated and would save much time (R.
289 to 290) . This was because the plaintiff thought
salaries were established in specific amounts by the
books and records, and the defendant thought salaries
were specifically established by an oral agreement
allegedly made in 1948.
In any event, a very lengthy trial was held and
theoretically reasonableness of salary claims was eliminated from the trial, followed by a memorandum decision (R. 148 to 150).
The memorandum decision found partially in favor
of the plaintiff but held that the salaries shown on the
records had not been sufficiently communicated to the
defendant, although there had been acquiescence and
approval by the parties of allowance of salaries to
the plaintiff and cross-defendant with no salary to the
defendant subsequent to 1948 and with equal division
of profits after salaries. The decision held that the defendant failed on his counterclaim (R. 150). This
4
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meant further trial to determine the amount of salary
allowable to the plaintiff under all the circumstances.
:Following the second trial, the Court made a decision allowing plaintiff less by $22,000.00 than the books
had shown and giving judgment for the plaintiff against
the defendant of $29,314.66 and requiring defendant
to account for $1,196.58 additional (R. 190).
The defendant appealed from this judgment, and
the plaintiff filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal and on
appeal raising restricted issues (R. 227 and 226).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts made by appellant at
pages 2 to 10 is rejected in its entirety. This statement
ignores the decisions, findings, conclusions and judgment of the District Court, ignores the evidence of
plaintiff and assumes that this Court is compelled to
find in accordance with the desires of the defendant if
any evidence can be found which will support the defendant's theory.
Because of the confusion arising from referring to
the parties as appellant or cross-appellant or respondent
in one capacity or the other, parties will be referred to
as they were in the District Court.
The facts before this Court are primarily those
stated by the Court in its memorandum decisions and
found by the Court in its findings of fact. These must
be accepted by this Court as the facts if they are sup5
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ported by any substantial evidence. (Jewell v. Horner,
(U. 2d 1962) 366 P. 2d 594; Lowe v. Rosenlof, (U.
2d, 1962) 364 P. 2d 418; Valcarce v. Bitters, ) U. 2d
1961) 362 P. 2d 427.)
In its first memorandum decision (R. 148-150),
the Court found:
1. The May 8, 1949, ( 1948) articles defined the
obligations of the parties;

2. Salaries as contended by the defendant were
discussed, but never became operative;
3. The interest of the limited partner descended to
his three children, and the plaintiff and defendant were
thereafter treated as equal general partners with an
outstanding interest in a third child not a party to this
action, recognizing that they might compensate themselves for services.
4. Cross-defendant's salary w·as combined with
plaintiff's as part of plaintiff's earnings.
5. The practice was established after 1951 to allow
plaintiff on the books compensation for his full time
services, also his wife's, and of allowing defendant nothing after 1951 until he claimed $2500.00 salary in 1959.

6. It was not a sufficiently consistent relationship
between labor and profits to be binding upon defendant
or to enable the Court to finally determine the capital
standings of the partners ;
7. The relationship of confidence between defend6
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ant and cross-defendant required a more complete disclosure of salary allowances than the evidence shows ;
8. The capital accounts in the books and records

were not adopted by the parties ;
9. Paragraph 4 of the pre-trial order requires de-

termination of all issues, necessitating further evidence
as to reasonable compensation in order to determine
final capital standings, which must be done by stipulation, by appointment of master in chancery or otherWise;

10. Statutes of Limitations are not a defense to

either party;
11. Plaintiff's motion for dismissal of the counter-

claim is granted.
After further motions, notices, hearings and orders
(R. 51 toR. 174), a further trial was held, and a supplemental memorandum decision was entered (R. 181183).

This memorandum decision adjusted all of the
factors and equities and allowed plaintiff compensation
that would be reasonable under the circumstances, the
amount allowed to the top man for 48 hours per week,
without any additional allowances or overtime or extraordinary services and not exceeding in any year the
amount claimed for plaintiff's services on the partnership books.
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment were prepared in accordance with these two
7
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decisions resulting in judgment as indicated (R. 184 to
191)

0

A 25 page Motion of Objections to the Findings
of Fact and Motion to Amend the Findings was filed
by the defendant, (R. 192 to 216) and a motion to
amend was also filed by the plaintiff -(R. 218-220). The
Court denied both motions in toto, holding that they
may be considered Motions for New Trial upon stipulation of the parties, which 1\'Iotions for New Trial were
denied ( R. 222) .
Notice of appeal was given by the defendant (R.
232-232A) and Notice of Appeal was given by the
plaintiff (R. 231). The Plaintiff filed a Statement of
Points on Appeal limited to the following points:
1. The books and records are binding on the parties.
2. The allowable salaries and withdrawals of the

partners are those shown on the books and records.
3. Judgment in favor of plaintiff should be increased by $22,018.00 (R. 226).

Plaintiff's Cross Appeal raised the following
points:
1. Defendant abandoned the salary agreement

contended for by defendant and it was modified or
waived.
2. The claim is barred by Section 78-12-25,
1953.

U.C.A.

8
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3. Any claim of defendant based on fraud, concealment or deceit is barred by Section 78-12-26, subsection (3), U.C.A. 1953.

4. By their practices the salaries on the partner-

ship books and records have been established.
Because of the length of the record and the numerous subpoints raised by the brief of defendant, and the
several subpoints under which the argument of this brief
will be made, and in order to avoid repetition of references to the evidence, specific references to the evidence
will be made in the argument of each point. It is believed that this method will be most useful to the Court.
Plaintiff does not follow the points of the argument as
contained in defendant's brief as not seeming logical
or the actual issues before this Court.

POINTS OF ARG·UMENT
POINT I
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS MAY BE
MODIFIED BY IMPLIED AGREEMENT OR
ACQUIESCENCE.
A. The Partnership Agre,ment of May 8, 1948,
provides for compensation before division of
profits.

B. The allowance of compensation for the partners
became a matter of agreement by practice.
9
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POINT II
TI-IE PARTIES ADOPTED THE BOOKS
AND RECORDS AS THEY WERE KEPT.
A. No salary for Sims was claimed or recognized
after 1948 until the $2500.00 in 1959.
B. Defendant was amply notified of the salaries
practices and acquiesced therein.

POINT III
WAS REASONABLENESS A PROPER
ISSUE?
A. It was within the pleadings and Pre-Trial
Order.
B. Defendant suggested at the opening of the trial
that it be eliminated.

C. The possibility that both might fail in their
claims of specific compensation was recognized.
D. The Court had the right to hear the further
issue and complete the case.
E. If reasonableness was a proper issue_, the
Courfs decision was supported by evidence and
is sound.

10
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POINT IV
DEFENDANT IS BARRED ON HIS COUNTERCLAIM BY THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS.

A. Claim for salaries is barred by Section 78-12-25,
UCA. 1953.

B. Action for salary based on fraud_, concealment
or deceit is barred by Section 78-12-26
UCA. 1953.

(3)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS MAY BE
MODIFIED BY IMPLIED AGREEMENT OR
ACQUIESCENCE.

A. The Partnership Agreement of May 8, 1948,
provides for compensation before division of
profits.

Plaintiff recognizes that Section 48-1-15 ( 6) must
be satisfied. In his brief, defendant cites the statute as
saying:
"No partner is entitled to remuneration for
acting in the partnership business." (Brief P.
10 and 19).
There is no dispute that this is the rule "in the absence
of other agreement," which is the preamble to that subsection of the statute.
The cases relied on by defendant plainly state the
11
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correct rule to be that the statute applies only "in the
absence of an express or implied agreement" or "unless
there was an express agreement or provision for such
remuneration." (Vangel vs. Vangel, 254 P. 2d 919, at
page 17 of Brief and Keller vs. vVixom, 123 U. 102,
255 P. 2d 119, at page 19 of Brief).
At the threshold, the written Certificate of Limited
Partnership (Exhibit 11-D), Paragraph XII, provided in part:

" * * * that the general partners shall have
the sole n1anagement of the business and business
activities, and shall be entitled to compensate
themselves for their services as an expense of operation of the business before computation of
profits, to the extent that such compensation for
services of General Partners is reasonable under
the circumstances. */ * * "
And paragraph XIII contemplated that the compensation might be unequal by providing:
"That the General Partners at the present
time are equal partners and shall share equally
in the profits; provided, that their interest shall
be: · readjusted as they make additional contributions to the partnership in property, money.
or services, or by adjustment of property values
by mutual agreement."
The Court in its first memorandum decision held:
I. That the Articles of Limited Partnership defined the obligations;

4. That the parties departed from the terms of the
agreement by their practices;
12
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5. By compensating Chambers for full-time services and allowing Sims nothing for services after 1951
and until 1959;

6, 7, and 8. That the practices did not establish

the a1nount of compensation to which plaintiff was entitled; and
9. That paragraphs XII and XIII of the agree-

ment make "reasonable compensation for Chambers'
services" determinable and required further trial (R.
148-150).

This ruling was a disappointment to both parties.
Plaintiff had contended that the specific salaries shown
on the books had been adopted by the parties ; and the
defendant had contended that the parties made an oral
agreement on 1\tlay 8, 1948, which the Court should have
honored.
In effect, the Court holds that the bookkeeping
entries established the salaries except for the confidential relationship existing between the cross-defendant
and defendant, which required a more complete and
specific disclosure than the acquiescence or adoption
which resulted from general practices. In other words,
"reasonable under the circumstances" as provided in
Paragraph XII of the Limited Partnership Agreement
is the agreement of the parties upon which the trial
court relied.

B. The allowance of compensation for the partners
became a matter of agreement by practice.
i3
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During the preliminary discussion of the case, the
defendant admitted that practices of the partners could
establish a new agreement (R. 267). And the Court
indicated that this was his view of the law (R. 267, 282,
283, 295) . But the Court in this case has he~d that the
written agreement satisfies the statute and establishes
certain practices that go part way towards fixing the
compensation but does not establish specific amounts,
and that the written agreement, providing for "reasonable compensation" enables the Court to determine that.
We have researched this rather narrow question
with the following results:

An annotation at 66 ALR 2d 1023 is on the subject: "Construction and effect of agreement relating
to salary of partners." At page 1027 the question we
are here interested in is considered, and this general
statement is made:
"Where a partnership agreement clearly contemplates the payment of salary to one or more
partners, but no amounts are specified, a number
of cases recognize the presumption that the contracting partners intended the payment of reasonable salaries."
In Koehler vs. Hunter, 166 Ark. 27,265 SW, 972,
973~ the partnership agreement provided that until the
company was ready to do business Paul Koehler was
not to receive any salary or other compensation for his
services. Koehler testified that before he undertook the
work, he advised the parties that he was going to charge
a salary of $400.00 per month for running the plant,
14
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and that the matter was mentioned at a later time, and
there was no objection. The Court ruled that the agreement contemplated compensation after the plant was
in operation but had doubts as to whether an amount
was agreed on and said:
"If no amount was agreed upon, appellant
should have been allowed a reasonable salary for
his services from June 1, 1920, until November
1, 1921. According to the weight of the evidence,
appellant devoted most of his time to the management and control of the business, and it was
contemplated between the parties that he should
be recompensed for his services. The record fails
to show what his services were reasonably worth."
and the case was remanded for determinaa tion of the
reasonable value.
In Ziebak v. Nasser (1938) 12 Cal. 2d 1, 82 P. 2d
375, one partner told the others the theatre managers
would be paid $100.00 per week and then undertook
management. The plaintiff made no protests, and the
management proceeded. The Court found that $100.00
per week was a reasonable salary and competitive to
the salaries paid to other theatre managers and allowed
that amount of compensation before division of profits.
Jones v. Jones (1934) 254 Ky. 475,71 SW 2d, 999,
1002, was a bitter case involving four brothers whose
friendly partnership ended in acrimony and litigation.
One of the partners managed the farm, and the Court
said:
15
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.''We think it was agreed that he shoul~ have
the active management of the part~ership. an~
should be paid a reasonable sum for his serY_Ices.
Shulkin v. Shulkin, 301 Mass. 184, 16 NE 2d 644,
118 ALR 629, is similar to the principal case. The
partnership was established by three brothers by oral
agreement, two of whom were to give full time to the
business and were to draw salaries while the other was
not. The oral agreement was that the two brothers
were to draw salaries of $35.00 and $45.00 per week,
and the third brother said: "That they were to draw
enough to get along on." The third brother didn't know
how much they were drawing but assumed they were
drawing more than the sum originally agreed on and
the larger amounts of $80.00 and $70.00 actually being
drawn were accurately recorded in the account book.
(This is similar to the defendant here, who knew that
while he was at Kearns Mr. Chambers drew an increased
salary because of his discussion with Beckstrom). (Ab.
121, 136, R. 1040, 1132). The Court held that allowance of the recorded salaries was appropriate, saying:
"The right of a partnership for compensation
of his services depends wholly upon agreement,
express or implied. * * * (citing cases). The
entire facts reported warrant the conclusion that
the salary rates rested upon agreement and that
their amounts were not unreasonable."
And the Court went on to say that allowance of salaries
during periods of disability was erroneous and that
charging partners for amounts in excess of their regular
salaries was proper.
16
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The only case on the questoin we have found, which
is later than the annotation, is McBride vs. Fitzpatrick
(Oregon 1960) 356 P. 2d 947 at 952. In that case Fitzpatrick testified that he and McBride had an understanding that Fitzpatrick would be entitled to a reasonable amount for living expenses until McBride became
active in the partnership business. McBride testified
that he did not recall any such conversation. The partnership agreement provided:
"That I, Ervin P. McBride, will not expect
to receive any remuneration until such time that
I am putting in full time exclusively with :Fitzpatrick Lincoln Mercury and Fitzpatrick l\1:ilwaukee Auto Sales."
And McBride admitted that when he commenced active
participation in the business, each partner was to draw
$60.00 per week. The Court said:
"From these circumstances, we believe that it
is reasonable to infer that the parties intended
to permit Fitzpatrick to make a reasonable withdrawal for living expense during the time he
was operating the Bend business without McBride's assistance. The provision of the partnership agreement set out above lends support to
this inference. The agreement made after McBride joined Fitzpatrick in Bend permitting the
former to draw $60 a week is additional ground
for inferring that the original agreement was
intended to permit similar reasonable withdrawals by Fitzpatrick prior to McBride's participation in the affairs of the partnership. We hold
that the trial court did not err in allowing a
salary of $2,600 for the period in question."
17
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Under these authorities, the Court properly found
the practices of the parties as to allowance of compensation before division of profits, and the Court fixed
"reasonable" compensation from the evidence. This
assumes, as the Court found and held, that the specific
amounts were not sufficiently adopted by the partners
to become fixed. Our second point is that the trial court
did not go far enough.

POINT II
THE PARTIES ADOPTED THE BOOKS
AND RECORDS AS THEY vVERE KEPT.
The Court has gone only part way with the plaintiff on this point. The Court has held that Sims was
credited with no salaries after 1948, at the time he went
to Kearns and that he never got back on the payroll
until a salary of $2500.00 was entered for him in 1959
( R. 185-186) . The Court also held in its memorandum
decision and in its findings that the parties acquiesced
in and adopted the practice of crediting the plaintiff
with salary for his full-time services to the partnership
(R. 149 and 186) but held that the fiduciary capacity
of cross-defendant and her husband, the plaintiff, called
for more specific information to be given to the defendant than was shown by the evidence (R. 149 and 186).
It is the point of plaintiff's appeal that the court erred
in going only half way. If defendant was charged with
knowing and acquiescing in and adopting the practice
of crediting plaintiff ·with regular salaries, then the law
18
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fastens upon the defendant the obligation of knowing
what those salaries were, and since they clearly appeared
in the records, he is charged with knowing what the
records contained.

A. No salary for Sims was claimed or recognized
after 1948 1JJntil the $2500.00 in 1959.

The Court found that there was a conversation on
May 8, 1948, at which salaries of $400.00 and $350.00
per month were discussed. Mr. Chambers testified that
this conversation took place months earlier when Exhibit 20P was prepared for Farmers State Bank ( R.
899), and he didn't ever testify that the amounts agreed
to were $400.00 and $350.00. Mrs. Chambers, who was
right with her father the evening of May 8, 1948 (R.
1536), heard no conversation that evening about salaries
and testified that the first she heard of such salaries was
in the taking of her husband's deposition for this case
(Ab. 64; App. A, para. 13; and R. 603 and 604).
Defendant has attempted to distort the testimony of
both of these parties in this regard.
But regardless of that, the testimony is overwhelming that defendaint knew that a salary schedule of
$400.00 for him and $350.00 for plaintiff was never put
into operation or practice. He saw the $2,000.00 salary
figure in Book 2-P and discussed it with Mr. Reimann
and Mrs. Chambers (Ab. 137, R. 1153); he had a conversation with Mr. Beckstrom (Ab. 136, R. 1132) concerning the 1951 return (Exhibit 23-D), and knew
that the salary for Chambers there was $4,778.60 and
19
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that there was none for him on the return, and that
neither of those figured out to the desired amount; he
knew that when he left the ready mix business in 1948
and went out to Kearns, he was getting no salary and
was entitled to none because of his conversation with
Mrs. Chambers about it. (Ab. 120, R. 1037-1038).
He knew when he signed Exhibits 63- P and 64- D that
he had left the business and gone out to Kearns
and that he was not going to receive any salary willie
he was there; and he knew that no steps were ever taken
by him after the Kearns venture was over to get back
on the payroll. He filed income tax returns every year
and had a figure from the partnership as to his share of
the profits and is charged with knowing, particularly
in the prosperous years, the basis of that computation;
he did not take the stand to deny receiving notice of
the income tax deficiency as shown by Exhibits 53-P,
54-P, 55-P and 56-P from which the Court is entitled
to draw the inference, which it said it would draw, from
those circumstances (Ab. 172, R. 1406). Defendant
did not deny the conversation with Mrs. Chambers in
March, 1956, when Exhibits 16-P and 17-P were prepared, and he is entitled to neither respect nor credibility when he says that he didn't know that the figures
of $57,000.00 and of $56,813.00 represented differentials in capital accounts based on wages for Mr. and
Mrs. Chambers and none for him (Ab. 165, R. 13631364) . Mrs. Chambers testified that he went immediately to have Jorgensen prepare Exhibit 8, and that
he came back with Exhibit 8 that same afternoon in
20
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order to have his own verification of the difference in
capital ownership of the two partners. Mr. Shirley
testified that when he prepared the defendant's 1955
and 1956 inco1ne tax returns, he had determined how
the profit was computed and had general discussions
about that profit with Mr. Sims (R. 459-461, 465),
although he could not recall a specific conversation in
which the situation as to salaries was specifically discussed (R. 45, R. 465). David Beal testified specifically
that when he conferred with the defendant in the fall
of 1955 or the first part of 1956 concerning Exhibit
P-4 and the status of the capital accounts, that defendant:

" * * *said that I had no right to be dividing
other people's money without their permission.
At the time I told him that I had taken the
books and my understanding I had done just
what the partnership agreement called for, and
he in return says that he would take care of
. Chambers' wages or salary or as he put it, and
that they would handle dividing the rest, and
that my services would no longer be needed."
(R. 319, A b. 19).
And it is only reasonable to believe that when Russell
Evans reluctantly testified that he gave information
each year to Mr. Sims either on a large memorandum
or on a small slip of paper or over the telephone, that
he was testifying to the minimal truth. (Our Appendix
A, para. 48, 50, 51; R. 1436-1438, 1483).
And when Sims had the chance to testify as to the
kind of superintendent and manager of the business
21
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the· plaintiff had been, he emphasized the fact that his
home and office overlooked the loading yard (Ab. 292,
R. 2172-2173), that he was aware of all that went on
there, and that he saw plaintiff innumerable times in
the yard (Ab. 289, R. 2163). It is utterly inconceivable
that this defendant, who was in the partnership office
at least six times a year, would deliberately insulate
himself against knowledge of partnership affairs to
the extent of knowing how the business was being run,
why it was so slow getting into a profit position, and
how much of his yearly allocation of ordinary income
for tax purposes was offset by wages for the plaintiff
and how much division of profit after wages.
And the defendant's employee Steiner, who apparently knew every entry in the partnership records,
was asked specifically if he could find any place in the
partnership records where the salaries of $400.00 and
$350.00 per month had been used. And Mr. Steiner
was compelled to answer that he could find no single
instance. (Our Appendix A, para. 43; R. 1347).
For defendant now to argue that his practice did
not accomplish a modification of what he claimed was
an agreement and what the Court found was a conversation about salaries in 1948 is to ignore completely
the cases which hold that the agreement as to compensation may be implied from the records and the conduct
of the parties.' Defendant's cases of Vangel vs. ·v. angel,
(supra) and Keller vs. Wixom (supra) go that far.
See the notation at 66 ALR 2d 1023 and cases there
cited, and the authorities under the next subpoint.
22
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B. Defendant was amply notified of the salaries
practices and acquiesced therein.
In considering what information the defendant
had about salaries being credited to the plaintiff, the
Court must have believed that defendant got excited
in the fall of 1958 on the theory that he then learned
for the first time that Chambers was being credited
with a salary and he was not. The evidence above recited
is overwhelming against any such contention. Mrs.
Chambers had recently discussed with Paul Reimann
the claimed overdraft by Sims (Ab. 172, 195, 196,
R. 1408, 1550, 1552), and Reimann had presumably
taken it up with defendant. This caused the defendant
to send Steiner to the partnership office to make a
tabulation of capital accounts which he did in Exhibit
47-P. It was impossible at. that point for defendant
to be surprised by what Steiner reported to him since
he had learned the same thing from Mrs. Chambers
and Mr. Beal more than two years earlier. Steiner
reported that Mrs. Chambers expected that there would
be some adjustments in the capital accounts, and this
took the form of an adjustment of sand and gravel in
the first part of 1959 evidenced by Exhibit 26-P prepared by Russell Evans. Sims gave "instructions" that
$2,500.00 of this would be salary for him and that
that the balance would be in the form of a sand and
gravel adjustment ·with no salaries thereafter (Ab. 176,
R. 1445). This meant the end of the partnership, which
shortly came to pass. It was beyond the defendant's
fondest hope that he would be able to eliminate the
23
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plaintiff's long standing salaries or have any success
whatever in selling to the Court the notion of his $400.00
and $350.00 claim going back to 1948. The obstructive,
steamroller, overwhelming tactics of defendant's counsel
succeeded in cutting $22,000.00 off the salary of the
plaintiff (R. 188), money which the plaintiff had allowed to accumulate in the business and the benefit of
which the defendant had reaped over the years while
keeping his own capital account comparatively low.
The trial Court has found that the defendant acquiesced in certain practices, including allowance of
regular salary to· the plaintiff for his full-time effort,
which salary along with that of the cross-defendant
was accumulated in the capital account, with no salary
to defendant. Being charged with that much information as a matter of law, the defendant is charged with
the reasonable implications and details of those matters.
The trial Court was compelled to permit the defendant
to put a blindfold on his eyes and ear plugs in his
ears so that he could say he didn't know what the books
contained. The law is not that naive. ·
A number of exhibits ·was brought to the attention
of the defendant during the course of the partnership,
and on each of those exhibits was contained information
concerning salary from the partnership for either the
plaintiff or the defendant or both. And since there is
no record of any kind in the partnership records or
produced in this trial which shows a salary for the defendant at $400.00 per month or for the plaintiff for
24
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$350.00 per month, as Mr. Sims contended should have
been the case during all the years ( R. 23) , each of

these documents constitutes a notice to the defendant
that the salaries were not being entered in accordance
with his desires.
Exhibit 1- P was always available in the office of
the partnership in its present form or in the form which
it had from time to time, the salary figures always being
the same (Ab. 144, R. 1194-1195).
Exhibit 2-P was the first ledger of the partnership
and shows only two salaries, namely $2,000.00 for each
of the plaintiff and the defendant during the year 1948,
which salaries were deleted as defendant said he kne"r
(Ab. 121, R. 1040).
Exhibits 6-P and 7-P were annual statements of
the partnership which Russell Evans testified were
supplied to the defendant, by mail, by delivery, by
abstract or by telephone (Ab. 17.5, R. 1436) .And certain
it is that defendant obtained the net income figure each
year for income tax purposes (R. 98).
Exhibit 8-P was a study of capital accounts showing the disparity of drawings and of capital balances
for the hvo partners, prepared by Mr. .Jorgensen, defendant's father-in-law, and prepared according to Mrs.
Chambers at the specific request of the defendant ( Ab.
56,

R. 529).

Exhibit 13-P is the 1955 partnership income tax
return prepared by Mr. Shirley (Ab. 36, 38; R. 425,
25
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426) with the revised depreciation schedule, which he
made for the partnership. It is related to Exhibit 19-P,
which is the an~ual profit and loss statement of the
partnership for 1955 and which contains adjustment
figures in accordance with ·the depreciation schedule
changes. Mr. Shirley then assisted Mr. Sims with his
own income tax returns for 1955 and the following
year (Ab. 39, R. 428).
Exhibit 14-P is the partnership information returns for 1956 which were available to Mr. Shirley,
as he assisted Mr. Sims with his 1956 return. Each of
these returns has a reconciliation of partners' capital
accounts and figures of net income for that year as
follows: Chambers' capital-$109,370.78, income for
1956-$27,161.75. For Sims-$24,866.66 total capital,
and $10,781.74 income for that year; with total capital
at the end of the year in the amount of $137,237.44 for
Chambers and $37,943.49 for Sims. Mr. Shirley testified that he was informed as to the income figures and
the records of the partnership, as an accountant preparing income tax returns should be (not abstracted,
R. 428, 431, 438) and that he di~cussed the appropriate
matters with Mr. Sims, including salaries (Ab. 41-44,
R. 439-444, 447, 453, 461, 465). Although, when he
was pressed to recall a specific conversation in which
salaries were specifically discussed, he was unable to
do so (Ab. 45, R. 465).
Exhibit 15-P is the study of capital accounts made
by Russell Evans, (Ab. 54, 174; R. 520, 1421-1422)

26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and which gave rise to the conferences between .1\lrs.
Chambers and Mr. Si1ns in l\1arch, 1956. (Ab. 54, R.
518). At this conference also was discussed the figures
given by Mr. Beal from 4-P of 90ro plus for the
Chambers' capital and 3Y2ro for the Sims' capital. 15-P
shows Chambers to own 72ro of the capital of the business. It was 15-P and 4-P that led Mrs. Cha~nbers to
take the matter up with her brother; and at that conference, they made between them Exhibits 16-P and
17-P partly in the handwriting of each. Mrs. Chambers'
testimony on this conference appears at Ab. 54-58, R.
518-533. l\1r. Sims' testimony is at Ab. 128 and 129,
R. 1081 and 1084. On Exhibit 16-P is seen the circle
with 90.5ro and 9. ro accompanied by the figure $200,000.00 and $180,000.00 and $250,000.00. And on the
same page are the figures showing the interest of the
partners as R. 4/9ths, T. 4/9ths and L. 1/9th. There
was then a recess while according to Mrs. Chambers,
Exhibit 8-P was obtained by l\1r. Sims from Mr. J orgensen and then Exhibit 17-P was written during the
further conference of the parties. On that appears in
Mrs. Chambers' handwriting the figures $56,856.15
and in Mr. Sims' handwriting the figures 57 subtracted
from $250,000.00 with the remainder again divided in
two, giving $96,500.00 to which is added the $57,000.00
to bring Tal's share to $153,500.00, thus showing the
theory that the unbalanced capital accounts would be
first deducted from the total assets of the partnership
and the remainder divided fifty-fifty, which was the
theory Mr. Sims was demonstrating to Mrs. Chambers.
27
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The words "wages M. & T." opposite $56,856.15 were
written on the page during the conversation, according
to the testimony of Mrs. Chambers (Ab. 58, R. 541).
On examination of Mr. Sims, it was plaintiff's counsel
who was mistaken as to which item was written on
afterwards. It was the pencil item "would be paid before
fifty-fifty split" and not the ink item in the same ink
and written at the same time as the rest of the document, ·which g?t plaintiff's counsel off the track at
Ab. 128, R. 1081.
Exhibit 18-P ·was another annual statement which
was presumably delivered to Mr. Sims since that was
the purpose of preparing them, according to Mr. Evans
(Ab. 175, R. 1437}.
Exhibit 21-D was produced by the defendant from
the partnership files and was identified as a memorandum on salaries which was the forerunner of Exhibit
1-P. This ties in with the conversations that all of the
parties and Mr. Reimann had with lYir. Beckstrom (Ab.
121 and 136, R. 1039 and 1132}. The longhand notation
at the bottom of the fourth page was put on by Mrs.
Chambers. it reads:
"Decrease Rowe's and increase Tal's capital
for old note, etc." (R. 1565}.
Mrs. Chambers testified that this was the suggestion
of Mr. Beckstrom and that she took it up with the
defendant, and following the conversation, she wrote
the' next longhand, which reads:
28
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"No, Rowe says pay it first, but increase capital
account for salaries of Tal and Margaret." (Ab.
193, 197, R. 1539, 1566).

This testimony indicates that the whole method of
keeping the capital accounts was discussed with the
defendant in connection with 21-D and that his suggestion was carried out. Exhibit 23-D reflects this. Mr.
Sims testified concerning this document that when he
first saw it there had been no line run through the
salary for John T. Chambers and that he told her that
the salaries were a memorandum item only. He was
not present when the revised income figures were written
on the returns (Ab. 121, R. 1041-1042, Ab. 164, R.
1361). It is significant that on this tax return when first
prepared there was a salary only for John T. Chambers
and in the amount of $4,778.60 for the year 1951.
Exhibit 26- P is a memorandum made by Russell
Evans concerning a meeting with Mr. Sims in January,
1959. The third page contains Sims' instructions to
Evans to make an adjustment in sand and gravel in
a total amount of $11,722.93 spread back over the previous nine years, and that the adjustment should be
$9,196.97 for sand and gravel and $2,500.00 for salary.
The second page has a notation that there is to be no
salaries from the first of January for the partners until
further decision, with Rowe to take an active part. The
first page contained the date of the meeting, J anuary 13, 1959 (Ab. 176, R. 1444). This document plainly
shows the realization of Sims as of that time that the
salary differentials were of long standing and were
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terminated as of January, 1959, until further notice.
But far from demanding a revision of salaries back
over the years, he simply made the adjustment in sand
and gravel and asserted a salary of $2,500.00 for himself as part of that adjustment.
Exhibit 47- P is the study made by Steiner of the
capital accounts in 1958 with computations at the bottom to indicate that the purpose of the study was to
consider distribution of assets in the event of dissolution.
Exhibits 53- P, 54- P, 55-P and 56-P were introduced through the witness Russell Evans (Ab. 170-172,
R. 1389-1411). Defendant refused to produce any
records relating to this adjustment of tax for the years
1952, 1953, and 1954, which resulted in a net overassessment and refund. Exhibit 53-P was sent to Mr.
Evans and called for execution of Forms 870 by both
of the partners. It will be noted that the second page
of this exhibit schedules the distribution of income for
those three years as between Sims and Chambers and
shows for 1952 $2,764.90 as against $8,167.88 for
Chambers; for 1953 $4,731.98 as against $9,463.68 for
Chambers; and for 1954 $9,825.60 as against $22,241.84
for Cha1nbers. Exhibit 54-P ·was subsequently sent to
the partnership acknowledging the agreement of the
taxpayer, and indicating that both partners had executed the respective forms 870. This exhibit contains
schedules for each of the years showing the adjustments
to the distribution of the income from the South East
30
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Ready lVIixed partnership. Exhibit 55- P is the report
sent to Chambers individually and showing the deficiency and penalty and the adjustments to income for
Chambers individually. Exhibit 56-P is the covering
page from a similar statement sent to the defendant
and his wife and produced from the files of defendant.
Defendant refused to produce the rest of the report,
but 56-P was admitted as raising an inference that the
balance of 56-P would be like 55-P and that both were
tied in to the Form 870 and the original preliminary
report and the final report which are 53- P and 54- P.
Both 53- P and 54- P contain on the same pages the
cmnparative incomes for the two partners for those
three years. In admitting these exhibits the Court said:
"You have it within your power to disprove
this if it is false." (Ab. 172-R. 1406).
And it is of some significance that defendant offered no
evidence from the Internal Revenue Department or
from his own files or any testimony of his own to disprove the inference that he had received these reports
and been cognizant of the comparative income figures
for those three years of the two partners.
It is of significance also that the income tax figures
reporting income from the partnership by the defendant
were identical with the figures shown on the net profit
page of Exhibit 1-P for each of the years of the partnership. The defendant made attacks on 1-P and attempted
to show that the figures had been changed from time
to time and the book itself was of recent creation. If
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that were true, it would be expected that the income
tax figures used by the partners would have been thrown
off by the change of records, which was not the case
in any instance. That, we submit, was adoption of the
records by the defendant.
Pursuant to the order of the Court, a statement
was filed by the defendant showing his reported income
on income tax returns for each year of the partnership.
This appears at R. 98. A comparison of these figures
with the net profit page of 1-P shows that the defendant
for each year reported for income tax purposes the
identical figures shown on 1-P. His returns for some
of these years were prepared by his attorney, Mr. Reimann (Ab. 114, R. 1005); for some years by the accountant Mr. Evans (who knew all of the figures connected with the partnership) (Ab. 136, R. 1130) ; for
some years by Mr. Shirley, who had revised the partnership information return for 1955 and then proceeded
to prepare Mr. Sims' own income tax returns for 1955
and 1956 (R. 438-429, Ab. 39); he then had assistance
for the years 1957 and 1958 from the very inquiring
and well informed Mr. Steiner (Ab. 47, 136, R. 477,
1131). And the defendant has the temerity to suggest
that neither he nor any of these well informed persons
ever had occasion to inquire about and inform him
whether profit and income from the partnership was
being correctly computed and reported to him, although
his share of the income was a substantial item-in 1954
more than $9,000.00 and in 1956 more than $10,000.00,
and in 1958 mroe than $19,000.00 (R. 98).
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In addition to notice indicated by the foregoing
documents there were a number of significant conversations, which inevitably gave the defendant information about the salaries that were accruing on the records.
There were the conversations between him and Mrs.
Chambers in 1949 and 1951 involving Exhibits 2-P
and 21-D, which cannot be ignored in view of Mrs.
Chambers' Ineticulous habit of making notes on documents to keep matters straight in her mind. Mr. Sims
talked to Mr. Beckstrom on the telephone in 1951 concerning salary matters of the partnership (Ab. 121,
R. 1039, and Ab. 136, R. 1132). He also talked to
Mr. Reimann on the telephone concerning his previous
conversation with Mrs. Chambers in October 1952 (Ab.
195, R. 1548). He could not but have been alerted by
this to the method of accruing salaries into the capital
account of Chambers. And defendant testified that
Reimann was his agent in such matters (Ab. 117, R.
1023, Ab. 133, R. 1115). When the defendant left the
partnership for the purpose of going to Kearns, he
discussed the changes w"ith Mrs. Chambers which would
certainly result in a different handling of salaries ( Ab.
169, R. 1383-1384). There is no testimony that upon
his return from the Kearns project he ever looked into
the records of the practices concerning salaries to determine what had been done and to arrange for a change
closer to his desires as to the future. This is because
he already knew how the books were being kept.
David Beal had a pointed conversation with the
defendant previously recited under Point II A as did
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Robert Shirley, the other certified public accountant,
who was aware of the capital account study of Mr.
Beal, had made the depreciation schedule for the partnership for 1955, and prepared the defendant's personal
income tax returns for 1955 and 1956 (Ab. 36, 38, 39,

R. 416, 426, 428).
There was a further conversation between Mrs.
Chambers and Mr. Reimann before February 13, 1957,
about overdrafts, (Ab. 195, R. 1550) which would have
been notice to anyone who was not already well informed, as plaintiff insists the defendant was, that the
partnership accounts showed a situation unfavorable to
the defendant.
At the Church Dinner in 1957, Mrs. Chambers
very properly brought to the defendant's attention the
unbalanced capital accounts and suggested taking in a
piece of property from Mr. Hansen, which could go
to the plaintiff and Mrs. Chambers to reduce their
capital balance. Mr. Sims said such was not necessary;
it could be taken by South East; all of which indicated
an understanding of the capital account situation and
no surprise (Ab. 58, R. 542) .
From this welter of evidence, the defendant was
reasonably and fairly notified as to the method of
keeping salary accounts and capital accounts of the
partnership. He lived next door and was in the vicinity
almost every day. He had no excuse for not examining
the records and knowing what was contained in them
and used the information from the partnership records
34
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in connection with his business at the sand and gravel
pit an,d his income tax returns. He must be charged
with knowledge of all that was on the records and be
held to have acquiesced in and approved the salaries
credited to the plaintiff on the books of the partnership.
CJ S on Partnerships, Section 173 (c) makes this
statement:
"Since each partner is presumed to know what
appears on the partnership books, as discussed
infra Section 227, where an entry is· made in
such books of a transaction which was beyond
the scope of the partnership business, after the
lapse of a reasonable time each partner will be
presumed to have knowledge thereof in support
of a ratification."
And in Section 227:
''It is presumed that each partner knows the
entries in the firm books, provided he has access
to them. The possession of access to the firm
books by a partner has been held to be presumed,
but the presumption is rebuttable by evidence
of non-access.n (Emphasis supplied).
Significant also are Sections 48-1-16, 48-1-17, and
48-1-2 UCA 1953. Section 16 provides that the books
shall be kept at the place of business and that "every
partner shall at all times have access to and may inspect
and copy any of them.'' Section 17 requires the rendering of any information affecting the partnership which
a partner may request and Section 2 charges partners
with knowledge of a fact "not only when he has actual
knowledge thereof, but also when he has knowledge
$5
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of such other facts that to act in disregard of them
shows bad faith." And notice is provided in the said
Section 2 where there is delivered through the mail or
by others means of communication a written statement
of a fact to a person at his place of business or residence.
Under the statutes cited, the books of the partnership are simply the books of the partnership and each
partner is charged with knowledge of the contents if
the partner has access to the books.
Under the decided cases, in interpreting the uniform partnership la-w, partnership books are held to
be sufficient if an accountant can determine the financial
condition of the business and the total amount for
which the bookkeeper is accountable. (Duncan v. Bartie,
188 Ore. 451, 216 P. 2d 1005; Dale v. Dale, 57 N.M.
593, 261 P. 2d 438).
There is some latitude in determining the sufficiency of the accounting, some of the factors being the
nature of the business, the intelligence of the partners
or the persons who keep the records, and the circumstances under which the work is done. (Dale v. Dale,
(supra); Bracht v. Connell, 313 Pa. 397, 170 A. 297).
And far from being inferior evidence, the partnership books are presumed to contain the true history
of the partnership, so that in the absence of evidence
to the contrary reliance may properly be placed on
them to determine the partnership agreement and the
partnership account, and where access to the books
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has been available to both parties, they are extremely
valuable evidence of the true partnership agreement.
(Darlington v. Perry, 354 Ill. 22, 187 N.E. 796).
And the ordinary records of the partnership are
prima facie evidence of the facts contained in them
and casts the burden of challenging upon the other
person. (Bracht v. Connell (supra).
And we submit that the use of partnership information as to income or profit in the filing of individual
income tax returns charges the defendant with knowledge of how the profit or income was computed.
For instance, in the case of Bernard Stoumen v.
Commissioner, 12 Tax Court Memorandum Decisions
267, the tax court considered the situation of a taxpayer who claimed he did not know that the partnership had additional income, blaming the fraudulent
withholding of income on a partner who killed himself
at the commencement of the investigation. The tax
court went on to say at page 273:
"A taxpayer is under a legal duty to exercise
reasonable care in assembling data for the filing
of an accurate return and may not ignore information accessible to him. Petitioner discharged
that duty by reporting all of the profits shown
to be distributable to him in an audit report of
the books of the partnership in the absence of
any knowledge of other partnership income."·
In the same case before the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals (208 F. 2d 903) that court held that the
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taxpayer had discharged his obligation to verify income
figures by the following comment:
"For the taxable year in question, Abraham
had an accountant audit the firm's records and
determine its income. Using the information
obtained from that accountant, another accountant made up the :firm's and petitioner's income
tax returns. Petitioner's ~eturns showed his full
share of partnership income as reflected by the
firm's books."
A similar view is indicated in Estate of Louis L.
Briden v. Commission of Internal Revenue, 11 Tax
Court of United States Reports, 1095 at 1135, where
the court said:
"The record fails to show whether or not the
decedent took part in the preparation of his
returns or the partnership returns. Most of them
were in the handwriting of Gladys Coleman.
She signed the affidavit of preparation for decedent's 1940 and 1941 returns. His signature
appears on his personal returns. However, he
cannot escape his responsibility for a correct
return by committing its preparation to others."
POINT III
WAS REASONABLENESS A
ISSUE?

PROPER

As above noted, both parties thought they could
prove specific schedules of salaries as being the agreement of the partnership. Plaintiff by showing the
entries in the books and records upon which all parties
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had relied and the defendant by showing an oral agreement concerning salaries which was never put into
operation. Having found against the defendant and
having gone only part way with the plaintiff, the Court
concluded that in order to finish the case it was necessary
to determine what compensation should be awarded
to the plaintiff under all the circumstances of the case.
Defendant vigorously resisted further trial on this
issue, claiming that it was beyond the jurisdiction of
the District Court. (See Ab. 226 and R. 151-158, also
A b. 226-234 and 236, R. 1740-1782) .
The plaintiff under Point II of this argument has
attempted to show that it was error for the Court to
consider further evidence on the issue of reasonableness and should have held that the defendant was bound
by the records of the partnership.
Both parties are in agreement that consideration
of the issue of reasonableness was a last resort in the
District Court, and both parties are apparently in
agreement that it is not before this Court unless this
Court first decides as to the plaintiff that the amounts
of salaries in the books and records were not binding
on the defendant, and as to the defendant that he has
failed on his counterclaim by which he sought to establish agreement of specific salaries.
Plaintiff submits that if the District Court was
right on those two rnatters then the District Court was
within its powers and was promoting justice and bringing this trial and this partnership dissolution to a logical
39
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conclusion by ordering a further trial on the issue of
reasonableness of salaries to plaintiff.
It should be borne in mind that the Court did not
want a further trial. The Court invited the parties to
cover this issue by stipulation, lest it consider the appointment of an accountant as a master in chancery (R.
150). The defendant challenged the authority of the
Court to appoint a master in chancery without his
approval (Ab. 226, R. 1747), and the plaintiff encouraged the Court to believe that the taking of evidence
on this issue would not be lengthy (R. 1749). (Defendant's refusal to stipulate the reasonable compensation and his objections to appointment of a master
are contained in a pleading at R. 151 to 158. It is set
out further at R. 1741 to 1744.- The plaintiff's suggestion is found at R. 1748 to 1749).

A. It was within the pleadings and Pre-Trial
Order.
Paragraph 5 of the Complaint refers to the plaintiff's "earnings for services performed" and in paragraph 6 alleges "that practice of the partners has been
to recognize claims for salaries for services performed
for the partnership by plaintiff and his wife, Margaret
S. Chambers, and to the defendant when services were
rendered by the defendant by making payment or by
giving credit therefor, and thereafter to divide net
profits equally between plaintiff and defendant" (R.
I and 2) . These allegations relate the claims to services
performed and, therefore, it is submitted, were subject
40
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to attack on the basis of reasonableness or the lack
thereof.
These allegations were denied in the answer (R.
20).

The 12 page answer and counterclaim and crossclaim contains nun1erous allegations which suggest
issues of reasonableness. For instance in paragarph 3
of the First Count of the Counterclaim and CrossClaim, it is alleged that plaintiff prior to partnership,
"was an employee of defendant in said sand and gravel
business working as a laborer" (R. 22). And in paragraph 6 that the initial salary schedules were "based on
the situation of the parties as it then existed, including
the services then being performed to the partnership
'tnd the responsibilities of the respective partners and
the amounts invested by L. H. Sims" (R. 23). In
paragraph 12 that when R. W. Sims left active participation in the business, "He would allow plaintiff the
sum of $250.00 per month for the time necessarily
spent to supervise the gravel pit and to perform some
of the activities which defendant would perform if defendant Royal W. Sims were not away" (R. 24). In
paragraph 17, the reference to the Agreement of Dissolution indicates that "items in dispute relate to salaries, actual contributions to capital, questions of unauthorized salaries, failure to accredit salaries, withdrawals made by partners, and other matters" (R. 28).
And the prayer for relief asks "for such other and
further relief as shall be equitable and appropriate in
the premises" (R. 29).
41
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The pre-trial order includes this paragraph:
"4. This issue will involve a contest of every
salary or partnership distribution e?try in the
book and also an issue on the entries that the
defendant Sims claims should have been made
that were not made." (R. 86).

Paragraph 7 provided:
"Parties have stipulated and reached an agreement that they can start from the balance sheet
figure and make adjustment on the issues involved in this case, on that balance sheet figure.
(which was then set out)."

B. Defendant suggested at the opening of the trial
that it be eliminated.
In the plaintiff's opening statement, it was said
that the plaintiff's
"salary has been entered in the book regularly, increasing as that is the amount his salary
has increased from year to year, and from time
to time we say commensurate with the increase
in wages generally and the general inflation we
have experienced and also in accordance with
the growth of the business which has been substantial." (R. 262).
And again at page 265 the opening statement referred
to increases in salaries commensurate with changed
circumstances.
After discussion of how the plaintiff proposed to
prove agreement by practice of the parties or modification of agreement, Mr. Burton said:
42
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"In view of this, the question of the amount
of the services in this action should be entirely
immaterial because he is going to rely solely on
the practice." ( R. 283) .
and again:
"Merely this, that the amount of services, what
these partners did, aren't going to be of any
materiality or relevancy on the matter of a
waiver. On the matter of any agreement, that
shouldn't come into it. We ought to eliminate
that entirely, that part of this, of any evidence
in this case."
Plaintiff's counsel responded:
"I would like to agree

* * * ."

(R. 287).

And Mr. Reimann then remarked:
"The question of reasonableness is out of the
question because the statute fixes that." (R. 288).
At R. 289 Mr. Bird indicated that he thought
reasonableness was one of the issues; and if not, he
would like to avoid it. From these statements, the Court
concluded:
''That the contention with respect to salaries
is that the salary has been specifically determined
by the practice and that you 'vill endeavor to
show by your evidence that there was a practice
and that practice established a specific salary
and that the matter of reasonableness is not an
issue in the case." ( R. 292) .
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C. The possibility that both might fail in their
claims of specific compensation was recognized.
Both parties expected to succeed in establishing
their claimed specific salaries.
The plaintiff argued:
"Now it is our position that if we are going
to eliminate the modifications as the practice of
the parties has established it, we should return
not to some fanciful agreement but to the actual
partnership agreement. Now we are in effect
before the Court, each of us, asking the Court
to apply a modification of the original agreement.
The plaintiff is asking that the Court apply as
the agreement of the parties, the practice of
the partnership in their conversations and in
their record keeping. The defendant is asking
the Court to apply an entirely different theory,
and we are both in effect asking to Court to set
aside the original agreement.
"Now our position is that if the Court finds
against the plaintiff, it is going to have a hard
time lodging upon the position of the defendant,
and may be compelled to apply the partnership
agreement as it was originally written, there
being no meeting of the minds hence, but our
position is not that." (R. 265).
In view of all of the foregoing, it was reasonable
to shorten the trial by eliminating the issue of reasonableness, and each side is still contending before this
Court that it was successful and that reasonableness
is still not an issue.
44
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D. The Court had the right to hear the further
iss,ne and complete the case.
The action is primarily for a partnership accowlting and requires an answer from the Court. Either the
accounting based upon the books .is tenable or it is
not tenable; and to say that it is not tenable does not
give an enforceable answer to the problem. For this
Court to hold that reasonableness could not be determined would force the District Court to choose between
two alternative positions, both of which had, in the
opinion of the Court, failed.
The Rules of Civil Procedure encourage the District Court to do what was done in this case in an effort
to shorten the trial, but with the necessary power to
obtain justice in the final result:
Rule 54 (c) ( 1 ) provides :
"Generally. Except as to a party against
whom a judgment is entered by default, every
final judgment shall grant the relief to which
the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled,
even if the party has not demanded such relief
in his pleadings. It may be given for or against
one or more of several claimants; and it may,
when the justice of the case requires it, determine
the ultimate rights of the parties on each side
as between or among themselves."
Rule 59 (d) provides that there may be a new trial
on initiative of the Court within the limits of Rule
59 (a) which provides for a trial on a limited issue,
provided the new trial is ordered before 10 days after
45
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the entry of judgment. The Court's order in this case
was well within that time and was conformable to that
rule.
Rule 4 (b) provides:
"The Court in furtherance of convenience or
to avoid _prejudice may order a separate trial
of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or thirdparty claim, or of any separate issue or of any
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims,
third-party claims or issues."
And in Section 78-7-5 under Powers of Court, subsections 8 and 9 provide:
"Courts have power to amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them comformable to law and justice.
"9. To devise and make new process and forms
of proceedings, consistent with law, necessary
to carry into effect the powers and jurisdictions
possessed by it."

We believe there is ample authority in the Court
to conduct the trial and defer the trial in the manner
it was done. The Court did all it could to conserve its
own time and the time of the parties.

E. If reasonableness was a proper issue~ the
Courrs decision was supported by evidence and
is sound.
Plaintiff proved a poor prognosticator in suggesting that the issue of reasonableness could be tried
briefly. That portion of the trial fills two fat volumes
46
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of transcript. The various Issues and aspects were
thoroughly explored and were fairly summarized in
the Court's supplemental memorandum decision (R.
181-183). This Court has held that it will affirm an
issue of fact if it is supported by any credible evidence.
Defendant in his brief makes no attack on the
}1-,indings of Fact relative to reasonableness of the
salary a warded to the plaintiff. His attack is directed
to the error of the Court in dismissing the counterclaiin
and the right of the Court to hold a further trial and
make a determination of reasonableness of compensation. In the absence of such attack and an effort to
show that there was no evidence to support the determination of the Court, a review of the evidence is superfluous. There is an abundance of evidence to support
each of the items mentioned by the Court in its supplemental memorandum decision. This Court has held
that findings or verdicts on issues of fact will be upheld
if there is substantial evidence to support them. Lowe
v. Rosenlof, (supra); Valcarce v. Bitters, (supra). In
Jewell vs. Horner (supra) the rule is in an equity
case where clear and convincing proof is required, that
findings will be upheld unless it manifestly appears that
the evidence has been misapplied or that the finding is
clearly against the evidence. In Cassity v. Costagno,
10 U. 2d, 347 P. 2d 834, the rule is that findings will
not be disturbed where "It does not appear that the
evidence is such as to compel" a different finding. In
Parrish v. Richards, 8 U.2d, 419, 336 P. 2d 122, the rule
cited from another case is that the findings will be
47
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upheld "unless it is manifest that the trial court has
misapplied proven facts or made findings clearly against
the weight of the evidence."
Defendant apparently recognizes, as the plaintiff
does, that there was arnple evidence to support the
Court's determination of what compensation should
be allowed to Chambers before division of the profits,
and that the conflict in the evidence was such as to give
the trial judge wide latitude in what evidence it would
accept and what weight should be given to various portions of the testimony.

POINT IV
DEFENDANT IS BARRED ON HIS COUNTERCLAIM BY THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS.

A. Claim for salaries is barred by Section 78-12-25,
UCA. 1953.

B. Action for salary based on fraud~ concealment
or deceit is ban·ed by Section 78-12-26 (3)
UCA. 1953.
These defenses were preserved at the trial (R.
1582), and in the statement of points on cross-appeal
(R. 227).

Since the counterclaim was dismissed on plaintiff's
motion, it would appear to serve no purpose to argue
these points. If the Court should reverse the trial
48
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Court and reinstate the counterclaim, plaintiff would
not like to be accused of abandoning these defenses.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Each of the parties went to trial initially in the firm
belief that specific salaries had been established which
should be paid to the partners before equal division of
the profits. The plaintiff relied upon long standing
practice of the parties evidenced by the keeping of
records that certain amounts were credited to the plaintiff for compensation for his services and the remainder
was divided equally with the defendant. This practice
had been uniform from 1954 to the time of dissolution
although admittedly, prior to that time, the basis of
the computation was not consistent. But whether consistent or not, it was established by the records and has
never been changed and has, therefore, been accepted
by the parties.
The defendant, on the other hand, relied on a claim
which has never received one speck of support in the
records or the practices of the parties from May 8,
1948, until the time of dissolution. The defendant's
claim that there was an oral agreement made between
the partners in the limited partnership was not borne
out by any bookkeeping entries or by any conversation,
document or claim in which the plaintiff or the crossdefendant or the bookkeeper Russell Evans ever acquiesced or supported. Defendant claimed that the
purpose of the agreement was to provide a basis for

49

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

division of profits for the limited partner who could
not render any services (Ab. 121, 135, 164, R. 1040,
1130, 1360) . The limited partner, L. I-I. Sims, died in
October, 1948, which was before the end of the first
year of the partnership so that there was never any
necessity for determining compensation to general
partners as far as the limited partner was concerned.
If this was the reason for the agreement, then the reason
terminated with the death of L. H. Sims. In any event,
the claimed agreement was sharply disputed by the
plaintiff and cross-defendant, and the books and records of the partnership contain no support whatever for
the claim of defendant. The Counterclaim was properly
dismissed.
The Court found that a number of practices were
established by the books and records, acquiesced in and
adopted by the partners and that these included crediting of the cross-defendant's salary to the capital account
of the plaintiff, recognition that the interest of L. H.
Sims had been partially absorbed by the plaintiff with
the consent of cross-defendant and by the defendant
as to his own one-ninth and that Lois Fors had been
treated as a continuing limited partner with a one-ninth
interest; that no salaries or compensation were payable
to the defendant after the year 1948 until he demanded
$2500.00 in 1959; and that the plaintiff, because he
was devoting full-time and long hours to the business,
was entitled to a salary before division of profits. In
other words, all of these matters were communicated
to the defendant by reason of the entries in the books
50
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and records, by reason of conversation, and by reason
of documents, knowledge of the contents of which are
chargeable to the defendant.
Plaintiff submits that all of the things which gave
actual or constructive notice to the defendant of all
of these practices likewise gave actual and constructive
notice to the defendant of the amounts of salaries being
credited to the plaintiff from year to year. It seems
that the trial court considered the amount of salaries
larger than the Court was wont to allow the plaintiff
before division of profits and that "reasonableness"
entered into the mind of the Court during the first trial,
even though it had been excluded by stipulation of the
parties. In this the Court erred. Plaintiff's brief has
recounted the many docu~ents and conversations which
brought to the attention of the defendant the facts
contained in the books and records concerning salaries
and capital accounts. The brief has recounted also
preparation of defendant's tax returns by four different
and well informed accountants or lawyers, each of whom
had access to the records and each of whom knew or
should have known the precise basis upon which salaries
were being paid and profits were being distributed. It
is unreasonable to assume that no one of these persons
would have gotten through to the defendant the facts
shown so plainly on the books and records.
And the existing books and records without more
were chargeable to the defendant as a matter of law.
He lived next door to the office, he conversed with the
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plaintiff almost daily, he was in the office many times
during the ten or eleYen years of the partnership, was
friendly with all of the persons who had access to the
records or were working on them and can point to no
reason why he should not be charged with knowledge
of the books and records of the partnership and, therefore, charged as a matter of law with what the records
contained.
But if the Court holds otherwise and agrees with
the trial Court that because of the confidential relationship existing, defendant should have been tied down
and forced to listen while entries were read to him or
forced to listen to a recital of exactly how salaries were
being computed and why, then it was proper for the
Court to complete the case, complete the partnership
accounting and dissolution and receive evidence on the
issues of how much did each partner contribute to the
partnership and what compensation s~ould be allowed
to each, all things considered. On this branch of the
case, the Court was patient and received all evidence
offered by both parties. Its determination of the facts
is unassailable.
The accusations of defendant against his sister are
unworthy of the defendant and his counsel. Their efforts to prove withholding of records, concealment of
records, and misleading of the Court fail completely,
and the Court found "no scintilla of evidence" to support their accusatory charges. The constant reiteration
of these accusations by counsel during the trial and the
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numerous arguments must not be confused with evidence. And it is to be hoped that the frequent repetition
of charges in the records filed with this Court will not
thereby be dignified by credence, but that this Court
will recognize that there was "not one scintilla of evidence" in support of these irresponsible accusations.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS, BIRD AND HART
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant
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APPENDIX A
The Abstract of Record of Trial Proceedings did
not abstract the pleadings or the exhibits. The abstract
was not submitted to respondents, and they had no
opportunity to make any suggestions or objections.
If it had been, the bias in the abstract, apparent from
a comparison of the record with the abstract, might
have been avoided.
This Appendix A is limited to objections to specific
statements in the abstract and to omissions therefrom.
The comments, which are included in parentheses, are
intended to give context to the material pointed out,
and it is admitted that the purpose of this Appendix
is to make up in part for the omission of evidence favorable to respondents from the printed abstract.
1. (Although the Court pointed out (R. 279) that

the opening statements were not evidence in the case,
the first 15 pages of the abstract is devoted to the opening statements and the discussions of issues. As a result
of these matters, the issue of reasonableness of salaries
claimed was eliminated from the law suit. Eliminating
the issue was suggested by counsel for appellant (R.
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265 and 282) . ) Respondents thought reasonableness

was an issue in the case:

" * * * The plaintiff is asking that the Court
apply, as the agreement of the parties, the practice of the partnership in the conversations and
in their record keeping. The defendant is asking
the Court to apply an entirely different theory,
and we are both in effect asking the Court to set
aside the original agreement.
"Now our position is that if the Court finds
against the plaintiff, it is going to have a hard
time lodging upon the position of the defendant
and may be compelled to apply the partnership
agreement as it ·was originally written, there
being no 1neeting of the minds since, but our
position is not that. Our position here is that
the practice of the parties as reflected on the
books and distribution has become the modified
agreement of the parties and is the agreement
which this Court should enforce in this separation. I think that presents our views." (R. 266).
And at R. 289 after the Court had indicated that reasonableness of services might be eliminated from the case,
respondents' counsel said:
"Yes. I thought that was one of the issues. If
it isn't, I would like to avoid it. If there is no
question here that the amount of salary paid to
Mr. Chambers and to Mrs. Chambers was reasonable for the services they rendered, then I
would like to have the burden of proving only the
implied agreement of the parties."
2. (Ab. 15 tries to make it appear that plaintiff
set out to prove an express agreement as distinguished

ii
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from a specific salary as pointed out by the Court.) The
Court and counsel many times during the trial reiterated
the position of respondent to be that the practice of
the parties in the partnership established salaries as
contained on the books although there was no express,
formal agreement to that effect. (Ab. 37, 48-49, 70,
229, and 231; and R. 418, 486, 632-641, 1751-1757,
and 1763). (It is not easy to determine why appellant
has italicized words on pages 14 and 15 of the abstract
unless it is to attempt to confuse this Court.)
3. Ab. 22 starts the 8th line from the bottom with
the word "are," which in the record is "were." (This
slight change makes plain the fact that the books were
accurate and that errors occurred when those working
with the books in the regular course of the business
took items from the books. As abstracted, it could mean
that errors presently result from the use of figures
from the books.)
4. Ab. 24, line 10, contains a statement by Mr.
Beal that:
"My own books are kept that way."
That statement was made in answer to the Court's
question:
"The Court: But would I understal}d from
that practice, Mr. Beal, in an informal way,
after that credit had accrued to Mr. Sims for
gravel sold, that there is no serious objection
as classifying it as a credit in his capital account?"
5. All of the material from line 8 of page 34 to
Ill
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line 6 inclusive of page 35 should be deleted from the
abstract. (This discussion dealt with the question of
what were partnership records, which was reiterated
many times by counsel for appellant, but which is material to no issue in the case, and in any event, the
portion objected to was not in any part evidence.'
6. The argument of Mr. Burton on A b. 37 is not
evidence and is an atten1pt to confuse the Court and
counsel by his gratuitous reference to "the burden of
an express contract," which was not plaintiff's position.
7. The reference "Mr. Bird" in line 10 at Ab. 44

should either be deleted or accompanied by the further
explanation of R. 457 that Mr. Shirley did not recall
the presence of Mr. Bird at those conferences. (This
is significant because of the statement of Mr. Chambers
that Mr. Bird was not employed until a much later
time and after the partnership was in jeopardy. Ab.
109, R. 952).
8. The first three lines of Ab. 45 do not make
plain the fact that Mr. Shirley testified that in a conference with Mr. Reimann he had with him certain
papers showing disparity in capital accounts, which
were discussed with l\1r. Reimann, and that these included a balance sheet, a profit and loss statement,
a list of equipment, list of accounts payable and accounts
receivable, "All of the financial information of that
type." And also on R. 461, Mr. Shirley had testified
that he had discussed with Mr .Reimann the uneven
IV
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capital accounts as shown on the books and in the
specific amounts that appear there.
9. The last three lines on Ab. 48 and the first three
lines on Ab. 49 should be stricken as another effort

to push on to plaintiff the burden of proving an express
agreement as to salary rather than an agreement implied from the practice of the parties and the partnership.
10. Ab. 50, line 5, italicizes "written" and then

neglects to include the statement from the bottom of
R. 492 that the only agreement in writing as to salaries
of the partners is with the Farmers Bank in Woods
Cross. (This agreement was later produced as Exhibit
20-P, R. 580 and 856).
11. Ab. 56, 5 lines from the bottom states: "I don't
know what Mr. Jorgensen did with the statement." But
Mrs. Chambers testified that Mr. Sims brought the
statement (Exhibit 8-P) to their second conference
with him (R. 531).
12. Ab. 62 in the middle refers to a conversation

between Mrs. Chambers and Mr. Sims concerning a
potential sale of the business and neglects to include
Mrs. Chambers' testimony that:
"The difference in percentage in the capital
account was the main cause of discussion." (R.
589, lines 26 and 27).
13. Two mistakes on Ab. 64 are significant. In

the second answer quoted, the second word is "believe"
v
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and not "believed." In both the deposition and the
record it correctly appears as "believe." In the second
answer quoted, the eighth word is "have" and not
"had." In the record it appears as "had," which is incorrect, as the deposition says "have." (Dep. p. 63).
(These are significant because it is Mrs. Chambers'
position that the first time she ever he_ard the figures
$400.00 and $350.00 as salaries was at the taking of
Mr. Chambers' deposition, when they were included
in Mr. Reimann's question to Mr. Chambers but never
used by Mr. Chambers. The two above errors would
make it appear that Mrs. Chambers was speaking as
of the time of the original conversation in 1948 instead
of at the deposition a few months before trial.)
14. Ab. 71, lines 7 and 8, state that Exhibit 28-D
shows salaries for Mr. Chambers and Mr. Sims at
$4,750.00 each for the year 1949. This statement occurs
in the question of Mr. Reimann, and is, therefore, not
evidence; and the question was answered negatively.
(It is, therefore, consistent with Exhibit 1-P referred
to in the same paragraph of Ab. 71, which likewise does
not show such salary for either partner in 1949.)
15. At Ab. 74, first question and answer refer to

"instructions" by Mr. Sims, and the next question and
answer refer to something volunteered with asterisks
separating them. The portions covered by the asterisks
are that Mrs. Chambers said:
"It was just understood for years."
VI
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and that Mr. Sims did not tell her what her duties were,
but:
"I volunteered it because we had no one else
to do it, and someone had to keep some kind of
order." (R. 662).
16. Ab. 75 includes several questions and answers
as though they were consecutive and as though Mrs.
Chambers recognized testimony by Mr. Chambers that
there was an agreement concerning salaries. There
should be asterisks between lines 8 and 9, which asterisks
should indicate omission of the following significant
questions and answers:
"Q. Now, Mrs. Chambers, there isn't any doubt
in your mind now, is there, that there was
such an agreement between your husband
and Mr. Sims on May the 8th, 1948, is
there?

"A. Yes.
"Q. There is doubt?
"A. Yes.
"Q. You don't question his testimony on deposition, do you 1
-

"A. Yes." (R. 668).
17. Ab. 77 in the middle of the page says the item
of $810.00 as charged does not appear in the book.
This is not accurate. Mrs. Chambers testified that it
does not appear in the book, "As a charge against Mr.
Sims" (R. 687), although it appeared that the item
does appear in the books in the John T. Chambers
capital account (R. 689).
Vll
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18. At Ab. 78 and 79 several questions and answers
are quoted. At the top of page 79 there is a paraphrase
of the most important question and answer as follows:

"Q. Well, didn't he tell you that you were to
run the office and take care of things at the
office?
"A. He said Tal and I were to run the business,
that he had other plans, and he did not want
to be bothered with it." (R. 700).
19. At Ab. 79 in the middle, the sense in which

Mrs. Chambers said "We still haven't established it"
is obscured by the asterisks. The asterisks indicate
"Now, Mrs. Chambers, I hope you will answer my
question.''
20. Ab. 80 has some asterisks between a question

asking the witness whether a statement of "no time"
was false and a question which accuses her of not informing Mr. Beckstrom about an agreement as to
salary. The omitted portions are lines 1 to 11 of page
707 as follows:
"Q. Well, but you didn't tell Mr. Beckstrom
then, informed Mr. Beckstrom that he was
doing anything for the partnership, did you 1
"A. I didn't, I don't think.
"Q. """Tell, did you tell hllp. anything about Mr.
Sims doing anything for the partnership 1

"A. We didn't go into a lot of details about it.
"Q. Well, you emphasized with Mr. Beckstrom
how much work lVIr. Chambers was doing,
didn't you?
VIII
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"A. He observed it. He w~s there in our office,
in our home for about six weeks." (R. 707).
21. The paragraph at the top of Ab. 82 is a self-

serving question which was not answered, and the question was stricken. (R. 716, lines 10 and 11). The paragraph should be stricken.
22. Ab. 82 following the question and answer at

the bottom omits the following (which indicates that
Mr. Chambers was kept fully informed as to the bookkeeping practices on salaries) :
"Q. Mrs. Chambers, prior to the time Mr. Steiner came over to the office of the South East
Ready J\1ix Concrete Company, you had not
discussed it with your husband up to that
time, had you?
"A. Yes, we discussed it on trips, he was always
-when we would go to the coast, he didn't
want to go back. 'What do we have to go
back for, just work and nothing but work.'
And I say, 'We have got to work and keep
on working until we can get something to
leave with. We can't just go out with our
suitcases.' We discussed that many times
because he was so tired of working night
and day." (R. 719).
23. Ab. 83 middle of page. The abstract states
that Mrs. Chambers remembered a conversation with
Mr. Sims about no salaries until the equipment was
paid for. On pageR. 721 Mrs. Chambers also testified
that she recalled no discussion \vith Mr. Sims "that
unless the company can pay salaries to both partners,
it can't pay a salary to either one."
IX
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24. Ab. 83 at the bottom refers to a loan to South
East of $10,100.00 although that matter upon objection

by counsel and discussion of the Court was withdrawn
by Mr. Reimann (R. 725, line 7).
25. Ab. 84, the question and answer are quoted.

(If it amounts to a matter of recollection of previous
testimony, her previous testimony at R. 519 should be
noted where she testified that salaries and share of the
profits had been mentioned to Mr. Sims. But at:;tually
the word used on Exhibit 17-P and which indicates the
probable conversation, is "wages" and not "salaries".)
26. Ab. 84 in the middle of the page refers to a
stipulation that the books don't show overdraft of the
Sims' account. The record makes plain that only overdrafts at the end of the year would appear on the books
because of their annual accounting, and that the overdrafts complained of appeared on worksheets made by
Mr. Evans. (See Exhibit 57-P) (R. 729 to 731).
27. A b. 84 bottom of page. The abstract does not
Inention from the testilnony of Mrs. Chambers that
Exhibits 16-P and 17-P were shown to appellant and
counsel at the taking of deposition (R. 733-734).
28. Starting at the bottom of Ab. 84 and through
the first paragraph of 85 is a discussion of whether
Exhibits 8-P and 9-P are part of the records. At R.
773 it is shown that 8-P is part of Exhibit 21-D, which
was produced by appellant from the records of the
partnership, although no reference is made to that fact
in Abstract 89 where R. 773 is passed over.
X
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29. Ab. 90 at bottom of page. The abstract omits
R. 786 line 27 to R. 787 line 9, where Mrs. Chambers

testified that it was her practice to put slips in the books
or a faint pencil mark and then, "Maybe once a year
after income tax, or just before income tax, to see if
the things are like Mr. Evans says they are."
30. Ab. 91 in the second to the last paragraph

refers to our interest in showing that Sims' confidence
in Mrs. Chambers was great, but the abstract omits
the staternents of Mr. Reimann: "\Ve will admit that
he had unbounded confidence in Mrs. Chambers, * * * "
but without admitting that she was given authority to
supplant the partners in the management of the business (R. 794, 797-798).
31. Ab. 92 below the middle of the page refers to
Exhibit 25-P but does not mention that she made it
in 1955 and discussed this memo with Mr. Evans on

the following income tax time and not until August,
1957, did she make the notation about salaries and "Aug.
1957" at the bottom of the memo (R. 801).
32. Ab. 93 toward the end of long paragraph states

that Evans made an entry and called it salary for Mr.
Sims, but omits the testimony that the entry was made
"at Mr. Sims' suggestion" (R. 816).
33. Ab. 96 at beginning of bottom paragraph. In

addition to making the statement attributed to Mr.
Sims, Mrs. Chambers testified· that he said:
''You and Tal have been running things long
XI
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enough. I am going to run it from now on, and
you can either do it my way or get out." (R.
829.)
34. .....L\b. 96 and 97 fail to refer to the testimony
concerning Exhibit 25-P that it was discussed with
Mr. Evans shortly after it was made and the notation
was put on "August 1957" at that later time (R. 833834).
35. Ab. 98 in the top paragraph erroneously refers

to Mr. Sims saying he did not want the partnership to
have a bookkeeping machine, when it was 1\tlrs. Chambers who said that, and the abstract fails to mention
the more important controversy over the purchase of
six mixers indicated by this testimony of Mrs. Chambers:
"He (Sims) says, 'Why won't Tal go along
with this thinking? I have been working on it
for some time,' and I said, 'Because we don't
need six mixers, we only need one at the time,
and we don't have the money for it. ''Teare tired
of doing without.' " (R. 850).
36. A b. 128 last part of middle paragraph. (The
abstract correctly recites that counsel for respondent
stated that Mrs. Chambers had testified that the words
"'¥ages, M. & T." were put on the memorandum after
the conversation. This only proves that counsel was
mistaken in his recollection, since an examination of
Exhibit 17- P and a comparison with Mrs. Chambers'
testimony at R. 541 indicate that those words, "Wages,
M. & T." were put on during the conversation with Mr.
Xll
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Sims, and were not the pencil notations put on later
to fix the conversation.)
37. Ab.

14~2.

At R. 1183 Mr. Evans testified that
the conversation in October, 1958, between Mrs. Chambers and Mr. Steiner is the first conversation in October,
1958, between Mrs. Chambers and Mr. Steiner is the
first conversation in which she expressed any doubt as
to the correctness of the practice of putting salaries
in the Chambers capital account. And following the
conversation with Mr. Evans, she never again expressed any doubt as to that practice (R. 1186).
38. Ab. 143 at middle of the page. Evans does
not deny that prior to 1955 he kept track of the salaries
of John T. Chambers and Margaret Chambers and
entered them in a capital account, and there was a page
for that capital account prior to the one now in the
book Exhibit 1-P (R. 1193).
39. Ab. 143 bottom of page. Evans further testi-

fied that there is no false information contained in the
present John T. Chambers capital account in Exhibit
1-P (R. 1193, line 26).
40. A b. 144 and 145. (The abstract glosses over

the cross-examination of Russell Evans and makes it
appear to be a meaningless controversy between counsel
as to the effect that Evans' testimony on cross-examination and in his earlier deposition had on his testimony
on direct examination. In his opening statement Mr.
Reimann had emphasized the claim that Exhibit 1-P
Xlll
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had not been prepared as to its capital accounts until
1955 ( R. 273, A b. 8) . Mr. Evans had so testified on
his direct examination and had testified that the net
profit page was not made untill957 (Ab. 141, R. 1178).
The extended cross-examination and effort to impeach
this testimony by comparison of Mr. Evans' earlier
deposition thus had an importance and an effect which
the abstract completely ignored.)
Evans was asked why he had not said at the taking
of his deposition that the .John T. Chambers' capital
account was a new page in 195.5, and the witness asked
whether the question had been asked him (R. 1194).
Evans also said that the only records kept of net profit
was on income tax returns, and he was asked why he
had not made that statement, thinking of his deposition,
and he said he would have if he had been asked (R.
1196, line 13) . Evans first testified that the net profit
page was made up from information on the tax returns
and that there was no earlier page on net profits before
the present one was written (R. 1197). Evans then
admitted that Mr. Beal could have examined the net
profit page in a ledger in 1955, and that it could have
been written before 1955, and that it is all in his handwriting ( R. 1199) . Exhibit 40-P was then introduced
in evidence. Mr. Evans testified that the tax return was
his work and that he determined the partners' capital
accounts total at $80,186.80. (The significance of this
is that the figure of $80,000.00 does not agree with the
total capital of the partners as shown on the capital
accounts 701 and 703 and Exhibit 1-P, thus tending
xiv
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to belie the formei· testiinony that these accounts were
prepared from the tax returns at a later date (R. 1201).
Questions and answers from Evans' earlier deposition were then read to hun wherein he testified that
he had never heard of the conversation between n.-Ir.
Sims and Mrs. Chambers in which Siins asked why
salary had been entered on the books for Cha1nbers
and nothing for hiin, as contrasted with his direct examination when he recalled the conversation plainly. The
witness then said that what he meant on the deposition
was that he was not present at the conversation (R.
1207).

Questions and answers from the deposition were
then read which implied that Evans was keeping a
record· of net profit divisions currently from 1952 on
without making any suggestion that the pages had been
rewritten in 1955 (R. 1209). The witness was then
read further questions and answers in the deposition
in which he had testified that the current accounts were
adequate although there was a question as to whether
the salaries would be altered, contrasting with his testimony on direct examination (R. 1215). Following
objections of counsel for defendant, the Court noted
that the iinpression created by the witness on his direct
examination as to these matters had been gradually
modified and that his testimony had now become contrary to that testiinony on direct (R. 1215). Upon
reading further from the deposition, it appeared that
the witness had never discussed inadequacy of the recXV
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ords with Mr. Shirley or with Mr. Beal or done anything
else about it although the matter of posting from the
net profit account to the capital accounts was a matter
of simple arithmetic (R. 1217). The Court also commented on this as being a change from his testimony
on direct (R. 1217 to 1.218).
As to the ti1ne when the net profit account was
created, further questions and answers from the deposition were read indicating that the net profit account
had been in existence during the time of posting to the
capital account and not created later (R. 1221).
41. Ab. 154, lines 4 to 7 state that the Court said
evidence there was no regular system of withdrawals
is "knocking down their case." (R. 1293 shows no such
implication in the Court's comments, but only that the
offering of a book showing incomplete records was
part of their counterclaim, if material at all, because
plaintiff claimed nothing for the book offered.)
42. Ab. 157 bottom of page. The abstract fails to
mention that Exhibit 47-P was in lVIr. Steiner's handwriting and was prepared from Exhibit 1-P in carrying

out Mr. Sims' instructions to determine what the capital
accounts showed (R. 1323-1324). And the Exhibit
goes beyond the question of overdraft to show a tentative division of the total assets of the business (R. 1325).
43. After the first paragraph on Ab. 161, there

should be added:
"Q. Where do you find in 2-P a reference to
XYI
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$400.00 for Mr. Sims and $350.00 for 1\tlr.

Chambers?
"A. I said it was a clue.
"Q. I see.

You figured that because of this

$357.00 for Mr. lVIortensen you might make

stick the argument that 1\Ir. Sims was to
be a little higher and Mr. Chambers a little
lower?
"A. That had been my understanding with Mr.
Sims.
"Q. But you have found no entry and I know
you have searched the records for this, which
supports $400.00 a month for Mr. Sims and
$350.00 for Mr. Chambers, have you 1

"A. No, I haven't." (R. 1347, lines 14-25).
44. Ab. 164 bottom paragraph, as to a theoretical
memorandum showing salaries as claimed by Mr. Sims,
Mr. Sims testified that he did not know that there was
such a memorandum and had never asked to see such
(R. 1362).
45. Ab. 165, bottom line. In addition to stating
that he did not accept the difference in their capital
accounts, Mr. Sims testified:

"'Ve talked about it in terms of them having
90 per cent of the business because according to

her statement there, he had more capital in the
business than I did at that time." (R. 1365-1366).
46. Ab. 167 bottom paragraph. After stating that

some drilling and blasting will have to be done, Mr.
Sims testified that he was not suggesting that the partXVII
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nership should remove the concrete on his land but only
that the land contributed to the partnership (R. 1373).
47. Ab. 173 at end of first full paragraph Mr.

Evans testified that he did not recall whether Mrs.
Chambers requested the preparation of Exhibit 57-P
(R. 1413), and after refreshing his recollection from
his former deposition, he recalled that he prepared the
chart without any request from anyone and for his own
information and the information of Mrs. Chambers (R.
1414).
48. Ab. 175, line 9. In addition to saying that in-

formation was available to Mr. Sims, Mr. Evans testified that he made a written statement of net profit for
some years and definitely for 1954, and is not certain
whether every year was in writing, (R. 1436) and the
copies were forwarded to the place where Mr. Sims
was (R. 1437). Mr. Sims never requested any information from him concerning the net profit figure he
had computed (R. 1437-1438).
49. Ab. 175, line 18. The handwriting to the left
on Exhibit 19 is either that of Mr. Shirley or Mr. Sims
(R. 1438).
50. Ab. 181, line 11. Mr. Evans also testified that
Exhibit 15-P was prepared "To show what percent
Tal had in the business" (R. 1481).
51. Ab. 181, line 18. With reference to Exhibit
7-P, which is a state_ment of profit for 1954, Mr. Evans

testified that he doesn't know whether a copy of the
xviii
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document "was sent up or whether it was deliv-ered in
person" but "I suppose that I would have delivered
it." (R. 1483, lines 8-14).
52. Ab. 193, line 2. Concerning the meeting at
Mr. Reimann's home in May, 1948, Mrs. Chambers

testified that she and her father were not separated
during the entire evening and that she was beside him
the whole evening (R. 1536).
53. Ab. 193, line 13. Mrs. Chambers testified that
following a conversation about Exhibit 21-D with Mr.

Sims and, she thinks, her husband, she made some notation on Exhibit 21-D (R. 1538-1539).
54. Ab. 195, line 4. Mrs. Chambers testified to

conversations about overdrafts by defendant with Mr.
Reimann two or three times on the telephone and once
when she and her husband were at his place having
some legal papers signed, the earliest in 1952 and again
in 1954 after the travel hatcher was producing (R.
1547).
55. Ab. 200, after the first full paragraph, in addi-

tion to the matters abstracted, counsel asked Mrs.
Chambers when, during the depositions, the phrase,
"None of your business" was first used (R. 1589). And
she then read from the deposition of Russell Evans that
Mr. Reimann objected to a question"as wholly incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial" and then:
"Mr. Bird: That objection is reserved by statute, Mr. Reimann, and you know it."
XIX
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''Mr. Reimann: It is none of your business if
he had 100 employees, it makes no difference."
(This is probably immaterial, as is the long colloquy
quoted at Ab. 187 to 191).
56. Ab. 200 in middle of page. Mrs. Chambers

testified that purchasing rna terial from another source
was not at Mr. Sims' expense because the partnership
did the biggest part of the hauling (R. 1592).
57. Ab. 231 after line 7. The Court was also re-

ferred to Rule 54 (c) ( 1) and to Morris vs. Russell,
236 P 2d 451, 26 ALR 2d 947, 120 U. 945, as giving
the Court authority to inject a new issue so as to give
a party the relief to which he is entitled (R. 1764).
58. Ab. 233 after the second paragraph. (The
important part of the long discussion as to how the
trial could go forward after the memorandum decision,
was not the contentions of the parties but the view of
the Court, which appeared at R. 1770 and is omitted
from the abstract):
"The Court: The Court believes in accordance
with the statute that partners in limited partnership agreement complied with the statutes with
respect to compensation and that had there been
a fuller disclosure between l\1rs. Chambers
and Mr. Sims so that it would have a period
[appeared?} clearly to have been binding upon
him, I would have found in accordance with the
book, but I was not convinced that it was a full
disclosure, that it was frank, that it was understandable between the two, as I think should have
XX
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been the case where that situation and relationship of trust aud confidence, brother and sister,
existed, and if I had been so convinced of that,
I would lmYe found in accordance with vvhat ~1r.
Bird contended was a practice and which I could
not see as a practice under the circumstances
adopted by the parties so that it would enable
the Court to by iinplication find that they had
agreed upon it."
59. Ab. 233, bottom of page. The Court indicated
its view that beeause of the written partnership agreement providing that the partners may compensate themselves, the statute was satisfied, and the practice of the
parties became admissible to show that Chambers was
to receive compensation for his full time and that Sims
was not claiming compensation. Except for a written
or oral agreement fixing salaries month after month
and year after year, the partners could have recovered
only their share of profits (R. 1771-1772 and 1774).
60. Ab. 235 at the bottom of the page. The abstract
sets forth at length a motion of defendant for production
of documents and brushes aside the answer and objections of the plaintiff, which, in addition to alleging
that the defendant's motion is frivolous, derogatory,
cantankerous and scandalous, charges that the motions
are dilatory, an effort to obscure the issues, resort to
prejudice and slander, to encumber unduly the record,
and to delay the decision, and that any issue of contempt
for failure to produce documents should be based upon
a charge, an answer, the forming of issues and a hearing,
but not as part of this case or in a manner to delay
XX:l
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decision, obscure the issues and impede justice ( R. 171173).
61. A b. 57, six lines from the bottom erroneously

refers to the handwriting of Mrs. Sims instead of, obviously, Mr. ~ims (R. 539). r.rhe previous line accurately reflects the record but the record is obviously
wrong in using the figure "$123,057 and $180,000."
An examination of Exhibit 17-P will make plain that
the witness referred to the figures "One hundred twenty
three thousand, fifty seven, and One hundred eighty
thousand'' with those words and that the reporter missed
the comma inflection after "one hundred twenty-three
thousand.''

xxii
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APPENDIX B
Note: A vast number of exhibits were received in
evidence and quite a large additional number were
offered and refused. The abstract fails in many cases
to indicate the character of the exhibits or the purposes
for which the exhibits were offered. Presumably, the
defendant handle~. this abstract in the way it thought
was most desirable. Plaintiff offers herewith, as an
abstract of plaintiff's exhibits, and as a convenience to
the Court in assimilating the great mass of oral and
documentary evidence the following comments as to
the purpose for which plaintiff's exhibits were offered
and the nature of the exhibits:
EXHIBIT 1-P was the ledger of the partnership
and constituted the basis of the accounting in the action.
The plaintiff contends that under the proprietor tab
were accounts of net profit and capital accounts of both
partners which were sufficiently definite to constitute
the final basis of settlement between the parties.
EXHIBIT 2-P was the first ledger used in the
partnership business and was superseded by 1-P. It
is in the handwritings of Mr. Sims (the back portions
XX Ill
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R. 1151) , but mostly 1\'Irs. Chambers, Shirley Smith
and Mr. Evans. (1\..b. 50, R. 494, 496).
EXHIBIT 3-P was a summary of the partners'
capital account prepared by Mr. Beal and showing
the effect of the contentions of the respective parties
as to allowance of salaries. 3- P was made the basis of
the pre-trial order.
EXHIBIT 4-P is one of the exhibits prepared by
David N. Beal in 1955 and into 1956 from the records
of the company. It is a study of the capital accounts
of the partners built up a year at a time and in accordance with Mr. Beal' s understanding of the partnership
agreement. The exhibit sheet does not show it, but
P-4 was admitted into evidence at R. 420.

EXHIBIT 4-P (b) was apparently not received
in evidence.
EXHIBIT 6-P is a series of balance sheets and
profit and loss statements prepared by Russell A.
Evans, bookkeeper for the partnership. There was considerable testimony on both sides as to whether these
various documents were delivered or sent to Mr. Sims
or whether some information fron1 them was telephoned
to him or delivered on a slip of paper.
EXHIBIT 7- P was similar to 6- P but as to the
1954 statement contained more specific information
about salaries than the other yearly statements. There
was considerable testimony as to 7-P and in what form,
if any, Mr. Sims had access to it.
xxiv
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EXHIBIT 8-P is a longhand statement of capital
accounts made by Mr. Jorgensen, the father-in-law of
Mr. Sims, and in his handwriting (Ab. 33, R. 382) .
Mr. Sims denied that it was prepared at his instance
(Ab. 128, R. 1078) ; 1\irs. Chambers said that Mr. Sims
requested it of Mr. Jorgensen (A b. 56, R. 529) ; and
Mr. Jorgensen wasn't sure how he came to prepare it
(Ab. 35, R. 409, 411), except he had testified Mr. Sims
did not request it ( Ab. 35, R. 383, 390, 406).
EXHIBIT 9-P is a typewritten copy of 8-P, with
figures for an additional year added.
EXHIBIT 12- P is a copy of a letter sent to the
partners by 1\-Ir. Ray Liljenquist in 1956 with a schedule which is the result of Mr. Shirley's work on the
books of the company.
EXHIBITS 13-P and 14-P are, of course, the
partnership information returns to the United States
and the State of Utah for the years 1955 and 1956.
13-P shows the division of salaries and profits for that
year between Chambers and Sims as does Exhibit 14,
and each shows 100 per cent of Chambers' time devoted
to the business and none of Sims'.
EXHIBIT 15-P is a study of capital accounts of
John T. Chambers through the year 1955 and showing
his percentage ownership of the business. This was made
by Russell Evans.
EXHIBITS 16-P and 17-P are notes made durrng conversations between Mrs. Chambers and Mr.
XXV
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Sims on March 7, 1956, and discussing the conclusions
as to ownership of capital as shown on Exhibits 4- P,
8-P and 15-P. Part of the figures and drawings are
those of Mrs. Chambers and part are those of Mr.
Sims, and the pencil notations were put on by Mrs.
Chambers after the conversation.
EXHIBIT 18-P is a typical year end statement
made by Russell Evans for the benefit of the partners
and showing salary for Chambers and none for Sims.
EXHIBIT 19-P was a similar statement for
1955, but showing net profit only with adjustments in
pencil, which became the basis of the 1955 tax returns
of the partners.
EXHIBIT 20-P is a copy of document filed at
the Farmers State Bank in Woods Cross in 1947 and
the document about which Mr. and Mrs. Chambers both
testified as being the only agreement concerning salaries that was made in the early stages of the partnership (R. 899 and 492).
EXHIBIT 21-D was offered by defendants but
is a set of work sheets or memoranda made by Mrs.
Chambers concerning salaries and which was preliminary to the salary schedules placed in 1-P. It also contains a copy of Exhibit 9-P.
EXHIBIT 25-P is a memorandum in the handwriting of Mrs. Chan1bers which she testified was a
notation concerning her questioning of the salary of
Mr. Chambers in 1955 in the amount of $11,700.00,
xxvi
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and her notation concerning that salary and which she
said was discussed with Mr. Evans. The notation of
August, 1957, is also in her handwriting, which she
stated was put on two years later. (Ab. 92, R. 798, 802).
EXHIBIT 26-P is two thermofax pages of originals made in Mr. Evans' handwriting and a yellow
sheet which is a copy of a memorandum made by RusseH
Evans concerning a conference in January, 1959, as a
result of which adjustments in sand and gravel charges
were made and the salary item of $2500.00 was put on
the books for Mr. Sims.
EXHIBIT 27-P is a copy of a letter from Mr.
Chambers to Mr. Sims typed by Mr. Evans and which
is self~explanatory.
EXHIBIT 32-P is not scheduled by the reporter
in his summary sheets for some reason. It was offered
and received at R. 1008 for the purpose of identifying
the time of a conversation with Mr. Reimann which
related to the $2,000.00 salary for each of the partners
originally shown on Exhibit 2- P and originally claimed
on the partnership return and then amended.
EXHIBIT 39-P is a record kept in 1948 of which
some of the entries were in the handwriting of Mr.
Sims (Ab. 182, R. 1497). The purpose and extent of
the book were not established. 1\!Ir. Sims testified the
first two pages were not in his handwriting ( R. 1149) ;
then that June and July pages were his (R. 1149-1150) ;
then that he was not sure (R. 1155); and then that the
first three pages were his (R. 1159, 1497).
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EXHIBIT 40-P is the U. S. Partnership Return
of Income for 1953 which shows one-third of Mr. Sims'
time devoted to the business and two-thirds of Mr.
Chambers', with income reported in those proportions.
EXHIBIT 46-P is a drawing made by Mr. Steiner
of the situation of the parties in Mr. Reimann's office
at the taking of the deposition of Mr. Chambers.
EXHIBIT 47-P is a study of the capital accounts
of the partners made from Book 1-P by Glendon Steiner
in 1958.
EXHIBITS 53-P, 54-P, 55-P and 56-P are all
related to deficiency assessments or overpayment of
income tax by the Federal Government and documents
which were submitted to the partnership and handled
by Mr. Evans and which the plaintiff contended were
brought to the attention of Mr. Sims in the process of
handling.
EXHIBIT 57-P is a graph made by Russell
Evans to show the year to year supplies of sand and
gravel to the partnership by l\1:r. Sims and his withdrawal of funds and to demonstrate what were called
by the bookkeeper overdrafts of his account.
EXHIBIT 62-P is an order of the district court
and is self-explanatory.
EXHIBIT 63-P was the exhibit offered when the
case was reopened by the plaintiff for the purpose of
showing the confidence which Mr. Sims had in Mrs.
Chambers and that he was unable to devote time to the
partnership affairs.
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APPENDIX C
ANSWER TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NOTE:
Plaintiff's Brief should answer the Appellant's
Brief. Much of that has been done, although not in
precise manner. When the brief was put together it
was too long under the rules. The affirmative argument
has been retained and the answering portion placed
here so the Court can disregard it if it wishes, along with
comparable portions of Appellant's Brief's Appendix.
To attempt to answer the Brief of Appellant an
item at a time and cover all items would only get us
and the Court lost in denial and refutation and would
accomplish nothing. The record is too long and too
verbose.
Typical of this is a 12 page answer to a 3 page
complaint (R. 1 to 3 and 19 to 30). And for what it
may be worth, plaintiff has examined the pleading
file in this case consisting of 245 numbered pages and
submits that of those pages plaintiff has supplied 47,
the defendant 135 and the Court 52, and 11 pages relate
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to supplemental proceedings in the District Court after
entry of judgment and should not be in this record.
Defendant's brief continues a typically distorting
note from the trial by stating under "Disposition of
Case in District Court" that plaintiff claims an express
agreement establishing partners' salaries. The complaint alleges in paragraphs 5 and 6 that the practice
of the partners modified the written agreement, and the
prayer asks for a determination of whether this practice
modified the written agreement (R. 1, 2 and 3). This
was made plain in the opening statement and discussion
with the Court, (Ab. 6, R. 267) where the Court said:
"Well, I think we could agree as a matter of
law that a practice established by the partners
could modify a written agreement."
At Ab. 15, R. 292, the Court again noted that the
plaintiff would rely on a salary that had been specifically determined "by the practice, and that you will
endeavor to show by your evidence that there was a
practice, and that practice established a specific salary,
and that the matter of reasonableness is not an issue
in the case." And yet the defendant delighted in refusing to recognize the issue as thus formed by stating
repeatedly that the plaintiff had undertaken to prove
an express contract fixing the salaries contained in the
books and records of the parties (Ab. 37, R. 420; Ab.
48, 49, R. 486; Ab. 70, R. 631 by the Court; R.
633 by Mr. Reimann, R. 638 Mr. Reimann, R.
638 to 639 Mr. Burton, Mr. Bird and the Court;
XXX
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A b. 229 and 230, R. 17 57 and 1760 where the Court
said:
"The Court will not listen to any statement of
that sort. There was no contention made of an
express contract and the Court understands what
an express contract is * * * ."
and again:
"That says nothing about an express contract.
We are going to have no more conversation about
express contract.''
At the bottom of page 2 of his brief, defendant
refers to the memorandum decision as holding there
was not sufficient disclosure of the entries to become
binding on Sims, whereas the decision plainly provided
that the practice was binding on Sims, but that in view·
of the confidential relationship between Mrs. Chambers
and Mr. Sims, the amount of the salaries set up on the
books was not sufficiently disclosed or imparted to the
defendant to establish the amounts (R. 149 to 150).
On page 3 of his brief in the middle of the page,
it is stated that the Court "denied salary to Sims after
July 1948" although finding number 7 allows the
$2,500.00 claimed in 1959 ( R. 185 to 186) .
And finally, defendant states on page 3 that plaintiff filed Notice of Appeal from the entire judgment,
although plaintiff plainly designated his statement of
points on appeal as follows:
1. The practices of the parties establishes the capital accounts in Exhibit 1-P.
XXXI
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2. Salaries and withdrawals are those shown in
the books.
3. Plaintiff's judgment should be increased by
$22,000.00 (R. 226).
Cross-appellant has previously said that the entire
statement of facts is unacceptable. To controvert each
misstatement would take too long and profit but little.
We shall content ourselves with the following:
a. At page 5 it is said initial capital investments
were R. W. Sims $16,355.90 and J. T. Chambers
$6,582.72 (Exhibit 5-D). There was no issue on this
as the pre-trial order plainly provided; and the plaintiff's account although in the file was not made a matter
of evidence as it was immaterial. Exhibit 4-P, however, shows the initial capital investment to be: At the
end of 1947-$6,562.72 for Chambers and $5,860.54
for Sims; and Exhibit 1-P capital accounts shows that
at the end of 1947 (partnership started May 8, 1948)
$6,582.72 for Chambers and $10,641.23 for Sims, and
the certificate of limited partnership itself recites only
the investment of the limited partner L. H. Sims, which
is stated to be $8,500.00. There was no testimony on this
rna tter at the trial.
b. On page 5 defendant says under (c) that
monthly salaries were fixed in the amount of $400.00
for R. W. Sims and $350.00 for Chambers, although
this was exactly what the Court did not find in its memorandum decision (R. 148 to 150) and its Findings of
Fact (R. 184 to 189) .
xxxii
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c. Page 6 of his brief. Defendant says that following the May 8th meeting and on "the next day ~~Irs.
Chambers prepared a memorandum or work sheet with
respect to salaries of Mr. Chambers and Mr. Sims" (Ab.
65 and R. 607 do not state that anything was done the
next day or for a couple of years, and the flrst Inemorandum was probably Exhibit 21-D, which was probably prepared in 1952 since the first page of longhand
in Exhibit 21-D runs through December 31, 1951.)
d. In the middle of page 6 of defendant's brief
it is stated that Mrs. Chambers destroyed the original
Inemorandum. The witness did not testify that the
memorandum was destroyed or that she destroyed it.
At R. 498 she testified:
"It was probably destroyed when it was all
entered into the books. We had no further use for
it."
But defendant had Exhibit 21-D unknown to the witness and had her identify it at R. 609 after testifying
at R. 608 that she:
"put them on a large spread sheet and had it
checked back. I didn't see any further use of
them. I might still have them in my personal
files. I generally don't throw anything away."
e. Middle of page 7 of his brief defendallt states
that salaries for Sims were omitted "without any discussion with either partner" ignoring the fact that Sims
told Mrs. Chambers he would be away from the business to take care of his affairs at Kearns. (Exhibit
XXX Ill
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63-P and R. 1037 and 1038, Ab. 120 where Sims said
he would absent himself for a period of time.)

f. Middle of page 7 defendant says Mr. Chambers
did not authorize Mrs. Chambers to change salaries.
Actually, Mr. Chambers relied on her completely, gave
her full authority in the office, and was advised by many
conversations as to the salaries. Chambers left this
matter to his wife, (R. 877, see also Ab. 135). Hereceived such general statements as satisfied him (Ab.
106, R. 114). He and his wife had many conversations
about salaries (Ab. 95, R. 826) . Salaries were discussed
a dozen times (R. 917). When Mrs. Chambers was
upset by her conversations with defendant in the Fall
of 1958, the plaintiff advised her that the salaries were
in conformity to the partnership agreement, that everybody told him that (Ab. 205, R. 1617).
g. Middle of page 8 the brief states that no one
told Mr. Sims about the explicit entries or omissions
until October, 19.38. This is fully considered under Point
II C of this brief.
h. On page 9 state1nents are made about errors in
partnership records. Mr. Beal testified that the errors
were summary errors (Ab. 202, R. 1605), and Mr.
Steiner testified that after 1952 no changes were made
except based upon depreciation (Ab. 157, R. 1321).
i. The brief at page 9 quotes counsel's statement
about Mrs. Chambers that "she was confused about"
whether she was a partner. This is cormnented on because
XXXIY
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it seems to reflect on Mrs. Chambers. Paragraph 4
of the complaint alleges that Mrs. Chambers as heir
of one third of her father's interest: "has treated her
partnership interest as being added to plaintiff's interest" (R. 1). The Answer denies that Mrs. Chambers
is a partner, and disclaims knowledge of how she treated
the assets inherited from her father (R. 19-20). The
pre-trial order refers to J. T. Chambers and Margaret
S. Chambers as "plaintiffs" for convenience (R. 86)
then recited: "The pre-trial Court was not sure of her
position in the partnership and denied the motion" ( R.
88). In the opening statement, counsel stated that Mrs.
Chambers' right had never been formally considered
"and we are making no point of that, we are not contending that she is a partner * * * . The parties have
assumed that they on one hand and the defendant on
the other hand were equally partners. * * *. " And
again, "There has never been any formal assignment of
that which is true and exactly the status of the crossdefendant I don't believe is material, but it may be" (R.
257). She testified that she was authorized to sign titles
as a partner (Ab. 63, R. 600) . And the Court asked
at R. 600, "Do you contend she is a partner?" It is no
wonder that she didn't know her status and that she
was confused about it. Pe~hap·s she was confused about
' the handling of her father's partnership interest; but
that is not to suggest or admit that she was confused
in any way in her recollection of the facts of the partnership or anything but methodical in the making and
keeping of memorandums.
XXXV
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ARGUMENT OF THE DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT
The record in this case is unreasonably long for
the type of problem presented to the Court. The trial
was a constant struggle between expansion and contraction of what was material; and when immaterial
rna tter came in, it had to be met with the other side of the
coin lest the Court place some weight upon it.
And so, in answering appellant's argument, there
is a practical problem of uncertainty as to what may
impress the Court and, therefore, call for some explanation or answer.
This answer to the argument of the appellant will,
therefore, be limited to a few matters, in the hope that
we will touch on the ones which may be of some assistance.
The first argument concerns ""\Vhat agreements
were made between the partners?" (Brief p. 10). There
follows an enumeration of nine so-called agreements,
none of which was given the dignity of the "Partnership Agreement" in the trial of the case. It is true
that plaintiff made no contention that defendant had
violated the partnership agreement. Appellant now
attempts to twist that statement by a wild, confusing,
illogical, enumeration of eight collateral matters injected by the defendant over the objections of the
plaintiff, none of ·which was accepted by the Court,
and all of which are in controverted areas of fact. There
xxxvi
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was only one partnership agreement in this case and
that was Exhibit 11-D. This matter was settled during
the opening statements and discussion, and is abstracted
at page 10 (R. 280).
On page 12 of his brief, defendant refers to "The
solemn admissions of the plaintiff and cross-defendant
under oath" that salaries were fixed on May 8, 1948,
at $400.00 and $350.00. The solemn admission of 1\'Irs.
Chambers was an implied denial.
"Q. In which the salary of $400.00 a month was
fixed for your brother and $350.00 was
fixed for your husband?
"A. We always fixed Rowe's salary a little more
because we figured he knew more about that
particular business than my husband did."
(Ab. 65, R. 605).
and Mrs. Chambers later testified directly as to the
conversation on May 8, 1948, in which she said her
father was ill and she was not separated from him during
the entire meeting and that there was no conversation
at all on that occasion about salaries (R. 1536 to 1538).
And when Mr. Chambers was asked whether it
was agreed that the salaries should be $400.00 and
$350.00 per month, he testified: "Not to my recollection" (Ab. 100, R. 873). And portions of his deposition were read, where, in a leading question, counsel
included a conversation of May 8th and the figure of
$350.00 and $400.00, and Mr. Chambers answered: "I
believe it was that. His was higher" (Ab. 101, R. 873).
XXXVII
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But he also testified that he was mistaken as to the
occasion of the salary discussion. .When asked about
the salary agreement in May, 1948, he testified:
"Not at that date, there was nothing mentioned about it.
"Q. Nothing mentioned about that?

"A. Only one time wages were discussed was out
at Wood Cross Bank, that was to get a
loan." (R. 898 not abstracted.)
And as evidence of that occasion Exhibit 20-P was put
in evidence.
At page 13 defendant's brief again refers to lack
of authority to change salaries, which is commented on at
page xxxiv hereof. It was for the plaintiff to act directly
or through his agent in matters concerning the partnership, and he approved at the time and approves now
the fixing of salaries in the amounts they were shown
on the record. The formality with which a principal
authorizes an agent to act, or ratifies the act of an
agent, is for the principal to decide.
No exhaustive research has been done on this question, since it seems fundamental that Mr. Chambers had
the right to authorize Mrs. Chambers to be his agent
in financial transactions and in the management of
the partnership. It was for him and Mrs. Chambers
to decide the formality which would be required. The
agency can be formal or informal, or can be implied
from words or conduct. See Corpus Juris Secundum,
TitleAgency Section 23, where it is noted at page 1048
xxxviii

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that family ties 1nake agency more likely and at page
1050 that acquiescence may be presumed from silence
or from permitting the agent to carry on the business.
A principal is bound where he permits the agent to act
in his behalf. (Gaines v. A. Fisher Brewing Co., 6 U.
332, 23 P. 755). Acceptance of benefits is ratification
of a contract. (Floor v. Mitchell, 86 U. 203, 41 P. 2d
281 at 287). And ratification with knowledge of what
has been done relates back to the time when the unauthorized act or contract was performed or entered
into. (Jones v. Mutual Crea~nery Co., 81 U. 223, 17
P. 2d 256 at 259, 85 ALR 908). The evidence is that
Mr. Chambers discussed these matters with Mrs. Chambers, that he left this part of the business to her, that
when she had a question in her mind in October, 1958,
he bolstered her and told her that the salaries were
proper and lawful and has confirmed and ratified the
contents of the books and records by his position in the
dissolution of partnership and in the prosecution of this
litigation (Ab. 95, 48, 205. R. 826, 483, 1617).

1

Page 16 says: "Both general partners rendered
personal services." This was never disputed, but the
plaintiff rendered full-time, exhaustive service to the
partnership, and the defendant served only intermittently and when invited to consider special problems.
Sims worked hard in the beginning (Ab. 51-52), then
was away on his Kearns enterprise (Ab. 80, 120) , and
never returned to regular work but only to special
matters (Ab. 52, 66, 74, 117, 118, 197). Defendant
had extensive interests in his sand and gravel pit, his
XXXIX
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Travel Batcher Company and his Mountain View Construction Co. Plaintiff on the other hand worked 15 to
16 hours per day, month in and month out in this business (Ab. 239 to 241, Exhibit 67-P).
Page 20 of brief, defendant schedules some computations of his accountant to show revisions in the
profit and loss accounts according to accounting standards ( Ab. 22, R. 334). Plaintiff objected to this testimony as immaterial because there was no issue in it.
There was no other testimony concerning it and it was,
and is, immaterial to the issues of the case. Defendant
attempts to inject it here to prejudice the Court. Regardless of the rate at which salaries were computed,
the losing business would suffer further paper losses
because of the salaries. But in this case, the business
later made money, was worth $250,000.00 in 1955 (Ab.
54, R. 518, Exhibit 17-P) and has had its best years
since 1955 according to the net profit account in Exhibit
1-P.
Under Point II at page 22, defendant again refuses
to recognize the issue before the Court by italicizing trial
on the issue of "express agreement," which has been
discussed at pages xxx-xxxi of tllis brief.
At page 24 of his brief, defendant is pleased to
co1nment that Mrs. Chambers said bookkeeping was
"way out of his line" (defendant). It is not unusual
for a substantial business man not to do his own ac·
counting work and not to prepare his own income tax
return. But defendant was no ignoramus, and he was
xi
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no dupe. He kept part of the record in 39-P. He also
had innumerable opportunities to confer on accounting
matters with expert persons. Mr. Reimann prepared
his early tax returns (Ab. 114, R. 1005), conferred on
tax matters (Ab. 44, R. 456, 457, 458), and represented
Mr. Sims generally (Ab. 117-118, R. 1023; Ab. 133,
R. 113). Mr. Evans was an accountant and was sufficiently valuable that Mr. Sims has continued to employ him (Ab. 136, R. 1133) . He had opportunity to
converse with David N. Beal, a CPA, (Ab. 19, R. 319)
and did confer with Robert Shirley, a CPA, who prepared his 1955 and 1956 tax returns (Ab. 39, R. 428;
Ab. 43, R. 453; Ab. 136, R. 1129-1131). Mr. Steiner,
with 35 years accounting experience, (Ab. 46, R. 472)
was employed by Mr. Sims from December 1, 1955 (R.
476). Mr. Jorgensen, his father-in-law, was employed
by the partnership, and was also an accountant (Ab.
32-33, R. 381). He also conferred with Mr. Beckstrom
of the Internal Revenue Service (Ab. 121, R. 1040).
He made the divisions of profit in the beginning (Ab.
52, R. 510), and gave some intelligent testimony about
capital accounts (R. 1363 to 1365, Ab. 165). If accounting was "way out of his line" it was because his
talents were better employed elsewhere.
At page 27, defendant's brief repeats the statement,
"We always fixed Rowe's salary a little more
because we figured he knew more about the particular business than my husband did."
In the beginning this was true as evidenced by
xli
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Exhibit 21-D, which shows Sims at $1.50 per hour,
Tal Chambers at $1.25 an hour, Bob Chambers at
$1.15 an hour and Margaret Chambers at $1.00 per
hour. The notation on the fourth page of that exhibit
was put on following a conversation between defendant
and cross-defendant, in which defendant advised Mrs.
Chan1bers to pay the note first and to increase the
capital account for the salaries of Tal and Margaret
since there wouldn't be money to pay them after paying
the note (Ab. 197, R. 1566) .
Exhibit 2- P plainly shows $2,000.00 for each of
the plaintiff and defendant for 1948. This was discussed with Mr. Beckstrom and l\fr. Sims and possibly
Mr. Reimann (Ab. 114, R. 1009), and defendant also
testified that he saw those $2,000.00 entries in Exhibit
2-P (Ab. 137, R. 1153).
Another unequal salary that came to defendant's
attention was the $4,478.00 on the 1951 tax return,
which was crossed out and changed so that income was
reported for each of the two general partners. Mrs.
Chambers testified that she discussed this with Rowe
and then crossed it out (Ab. 72, R. 655), and defendant
testified that he saw it and discussed it (Ab. 121, R.
1041 and 1042). Exhibit 22-D shows the same salaries
for plaintiff and for defendant, and this was discussed
with defendant in May, 1949. Mr. Chambers testified
that Mr. Sims' handwriting was on the document (R.
641, not abstracted). Since the amount of time spent
by the two partners in the business was so disproporxlii
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tionate, the approximate hourly rate was certainly the
most appropriate and undoubtedly would have been
continued had both partners continued to work in the
business. The unevenness of the salaries is no problem
under the partnership agreement since Paragraph
XIII contemplates that the capital accounts may become unequal through contributions of capital or
services.
Page 27 of the defendant's brief accuses Mrs.
Chambers of "secretly" putting salaries on an hourly
basis. This accusation has substance only in the minds
of defendant and his counsel. Defendant testified he
did absolutely nothing to inform himself as to the salary
account. Testimony is that he received statements, held
numerous conferences, Mrs. Chambers attempted to
discuss matters with him, the books and records were
always open and available, and even though he lived
next door, he testified he didn't bother to obtain any
inforination. These matters were detailed with reference
to the records at pages 23 to 34 of this brief.
On page 32 defendant's brief decries Mr. Chambers'
"huge salary" of $11,700.00 per year. A salary is large
or small in comparison with surrounding circumstances.
Mrs. Chambers questioned this salary at first and then
upon computation of hours worked and rate per hour
as compared with other employees, concluded that it
was a reasonable salary (Ab. 90, R. 782-783). If
plaintiff worked 15 hours a day, 6 days a week, he
would work 4,680 hours a year or $2.50 per hour. The
xliii
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business grew from 13,071 cubic yards in 1948 to 42,709
in 1955, when it was worth $250,000.00 (Ab. 57, R.
533) and to 55,704 cubic yards in 1958 (Ab. 49, R.
487) . According to Exhibit 1-P, Account Net Profits,
the profits distributed were $10,781.74 in 1956 and
slightly less than that in other years with $19,127.00
to each partner in 1958, (R. 41) on an original investment of a few thousand dollars. The gross receipts
in 1958 were $686,683.05 (Exhibit 1-P, Amount No.
801) compared to $100,163.73 in 1948 (Exhibit 44-D).
Defendant's salary from just one of his other enterprises was $11,000.00in each of 1957 and 1958 (R. 42).
By what standard of comparison does the defendant call this plaintiff manager's salary "huge"?
At page 35 defendant's brief says that Exhibits
21-D and 22-D "escaped destruction" and then cites
a case involving "willful destruction, suppression, alteration, or fabrication of documentary evidence." Defendant and his counsel spent so much time on insinuation, accusation, and examination of witnesses about
destruction of records and failure to produce records
that the Court gave him a chance to prove and found
not one scintilla of evidence to support the elaborate
accusations. At R. 167 to 169, the Court said:
"To clear the record, then the Court will hear
no further evidence on the motions of defendant
R. W. Sims filed April 21, 1961, and the Court
finds from the evidence on the sampling of these
motions, no scintilla of evidence developed as
indicating that the plaintiff or the cross-defend·
xliv
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ant has willfully, intentionally, purposely destroyed or concealed or refused to deliver records
and that there is not evidence nor a scintilla of
evidence produced by their sampling of the motion of an intent to willfully and intentionally
defraud the court." (Ab. 319, R. 23, 28-29).
By what weird process defendant's counsel justified
themselves in saying at page 36, "Mrs. Chambers admittedly altered Exhibit 17 -P behind the back of her
brother by adding 'Wages M. & T.' after the figures
of $56,865.15" is difficult to _comprehend. She testified
specifically that those words were written on during
the conversation with her brother on March 7, 1956,
and that only the pencil figures were her own notations
n1ade afterwards. When the exhibit was offered in
evidence, Mrs. Chambers testified that the figures
$56,856.15 were in her handwriting and the figures on
the right hand side were in the handwriting of her
brother and then that below the word "Notes" there
are some pencilled words in her handwriting which were
not written during the conversation (R. 540). We
asked to erase the pencil markings to which there was
objection, so the pencil markings were left on. Then
this question :
" Now there are a number of other markings
on this exhibit, were those other markings
made during the conversation?
"A. Yes. There is an asterisk that was referring
from the $56,866.15 down to the figure just
like it in the other-down in th lower part,
and it says: 'Wages, Margaret and Tal.'
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"Q. Well, did 1\'Ir. Sims say anything about
that?

"A. 'I'hat the wages would be paid before the
split of the other assets." (R. 541, abstracted
in part at p. 58).
Then on cross-examination, counsel for defendant
asked Mrs. Chambers if she mentioned "because our
salary and share of the profit had been plowed back
into the business" and she answered that she wasn't sure
of the word "salaries" (A b. 84, R. 729). There was no
specific cross-examination as to the part that says:
'""Wages M. & T." And in the examination of Mr. Sims,
his attention was directed to Exhibit 17-P as abstracted
at page 128, R. 1081. The question was:
"Now I call your attention, Mr. Sims, to a
notation on this document over on the side,
the figure '56,865.15'. There is the notation
Wages M. & T.', was that put on in your
presence?
"A. Not that I recall. This is made up with a
pen."
It is obvious that at that point both the Court and
counsel for plaintiff mistook the words about which
counsel was interrogating Mr. Sims for the pencil
notations referred to in the previous question, which
were made in pencil and which counsel offered to strike
from the exhibit, and that mistake is made plain from
the following comments:
"Mr. Bird: Now if the Court please, I regard
that as a ridiculous question. We ask that that
xlvi
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be stricken, because Mrs. Chambers testified
that those were her words and she put them on
later, and counsel refused to let them be stricken.
They said she wanted them on. Now he is apparently attempting to impeach our case by
showing that those words were not there at the
time, and I ask how ridiculous can we be.
"Mr. Reimann: If he says now that they were
put on later, I will accept that statement.
"Mr. Bird: I said so at the tillte, and Mrs.
Chambers so testified, and we wanted to strike
them and counsel refused to let them be stricken.
"Mr. Reimann: That isn't the way I remember.
"The Court: It is my recollection of the testimony to the effect that they were added at a
later date, Mr. Reimann.
"Mr. Reimann: But she was-and that they
were not added in the presence of Mr. Sims.
"Mr. Bird: And we asked to have them stricken
and counsel refused.
"Mr. Reimann: There is a cross mark and following that the word is 'Wages, M. & T.' " (R.
1081-1082).

and counsel then went on to other matters.
It is, therefore, plain that Mrs. Chambers' testimony was not withdrawn, and she plainly testified that
those words "Wages M. & T." were put on during the
conversation and in ink. It was counsel and the Court
who were mistaken as to -what words were put on in
pencil, and furthermore the words "behind the back
xlvii
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of her brother" had no justification whatever. As to
the pencil markings on the exhibit, 1\Irs. Chambers
frankly testified that they were put on afterwards and
for her own information (R. 539, 540). But as to the
portions written in ink, her testimony was definite that
they were written during the conversation.
One of the problems in trying a long case is the
recollection of precise testimony given by the witnesses.
This was just an instance of faulty recollection by one
counsel and by the Court. The point was put in issue
by the conflicting testimony with counsel's statement;
but the nature of t~e ink and the appearance of the
document all favor the testimony of Mrs. Chambers.
And her pencil notations were admittedly put on by
her later.
And at the same page of the brief, it is stated that
Mrs. Chambers "falsely represented to Mr. Sims that
$56,865.15 was the balance of the Chambers capital
account in excess of the Sims account." The difference
in capital accounts as shown in Exhibit 1-P at the end
of 1955 is $53,291.71. The difference on the tax return,
13-P, is $62,538.99, which was made after the adjustment of the depreciation account by Mr. Shirley and
19-P shows the increase of income by some $7,000.00.
Exhibit 13-P is undated, and it is reasonable to assume
that on March 7, 1956, the date of the making of Exhibits 16-P and 17-P (Ab. 55, R. 522) a different figure
had been computed by Mr. Evans using the profit and
loss statement, which is 19-P. Defendant did not go
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into this matter at the trial, and it was, therefore, not
possible to have Mr. Evans reconstruct the figure of
$56,856.15. But there is no support whatever for the
charge that it was falsely represented by Mrs. Chambers.
At page 47, the defendant again harps on the refrain "that there is an express agreement" which has
previous been referred to. Some people believe that
if you say a thing often enough and loud enough, it
will gain acceptance regardless of its truth.
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